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SOUTH AFRICA'S AMNESTY PROCESS: A VIABLE ROUTE
TOWARD TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION?
Emily H. McCarthy*
The road to democracy for South Africa was based on compromise. One of
the most significant compromises made by the negotiators was the
acceptance of an amnesty process culminating in the passage of the
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995. The Act
grants full indemnity from criminal and civil prosecution to anyone
affiliated with a political organization who committed an "act associated
with a political objective" and who fully discloses all relevant facts. The
purpose of the Act is twofold: to establish the "truth" about the apartheid
past and to promote "reconciliation" among South Africans.
Unfortunately, such goals are often in conflict. This Note examines the
origin and nature of the Act, how it is being applied, and whether it is
meeting the dual goals of "truth "and "reconciliation."
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INTRODUCTION
The death of a despotic state is often slow and painful, and the
state's transition to democracy rarely follows a direct or smooth
path. When South Africa found itself struggling to dismantle the
apartheid regime and create an environment in which free and
democratic elections could take place, the nation's routes toward a
peaceful settlement were limited. With military and economic power
held primarily by the NP, the African National Congress ("ANC")
and other anti-apartheid organizations had little leverage in the ne-
gotiations process other than their sheer numbers and the support of
the international human rights community. Desperate to avoid fur-
ther bloodshed and to establish a constitution that would guarantee
fundamental rights and receive the support of rival political factions,
the negotiators were forced to make difficult compromises. One of
the most significant compromises was made at "the twelfth hour"'
during the drafting of the interim Constitution in 1993, when an
epilogue3 was added requiring Parliament to pass a law that would
make amnesty available to all participants in South Africa's political
1. The Human Rights Commission reported in a statistical summary that during
the three-year period between July 1990 and June 1993, there were 9878 incidents of
political violence in South Africa resulting in 9325 deaths. See HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENT TO SPECIAL REPORT SR-13 (1994) [hereinafter HRC
SUPPLEMENT].
2. Interview with George Bizos, Director of the Legal Resources Center of Johan-
nesburg South Africa, in Johannesburg, South Africa (Oct. 23, 1996) (on file with
author). George Bizos, an advocate at the Legal Resources Center of Johannesburg,
helped draft the interim and final Constitutions and the amnesty provisions of the
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995. He described the decision
to establish an amnesty process as the outgrowth of a political compromise made at
the "twelfth hour" of grueling negotiations.
3. See infra text accompanying note 55.
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war. This concession has been quite costly and controversial, and it
is far from clear that the amnesty process will in fact lead to the
"truth" about the apartheid past and promote "reconciliation"
among South Africans.!
This Note examines the amnesty provisions of the Promotion of
National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 19955 to determine whether
they can be interpreted and applied in a way that will effectively
disclose the truth and simultaneously foster reconciliation. South
Africa's political leaders made two critical choices in deciding to
offer amnesty in exchange for peace and truth about the nation's
past. The first was to accept the language of the epilogue to the
interim Constitution which required the future democratically
elected Parliament to pass an amnesty law. The second, made by an
ANC-dominated Parliament in June 1995, was to pass the Promotion
of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995, ("Truth and
Reconciliation Act"), which defines the scope and terms of the
amnesty process. This Note begins by assessing the necessity of
these decisions and their accompanying risks and alleged benefits.
The requirements for amnesty under the Truth and
Reconciliation Act are marginal. In order to obtain amnesty, an
applicant must prove a prior affiliation with a known political
organization, demonstrate that he counitted "an act associated with
a political objective" between March 1960 and May 1994, and fully
disclose all facts relevant to his political act. Applicants who satisfy
these requirements receive protection from both criminal and civil
liability. This Note critiques how these requirements have been
applied and interpreted in some of the public hearings and decisions
of the Amnesty Committee, and questions whether this amnesty
process will ultimately foster "reconciliation." With the aim of
achieving a constructive balance between the Act's dual goals of
truth and reconciliation, this Note encourages the Amnesty
Committee to interpret the three amnesty requirements narrowly in
an effort to distinguish genuine political resistance from
4. The authors of the book RECONCILIATION THROUGH TRUTH define reconcilia-
tion as:
the facing of unwelcome truths in order to harmonise incommensurable
world views so that inevitable and continuing conflicts and differences
stand at least within a single universe of comprehensibility .... Recon-
ciliation... is thus a real closing of the ledger book of the past. A crucial
element in that closing is an ending of the divisive cycle of accusation,
denial and counter-accusation; not a forgetting of these accusations and
counter-accusations, but more a settling of them through a process of
evaluation ....
KADER ASMAL ET AL., RECONCILIATION THROUGH TRUTH 46-47 (1996).
5. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995.
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indefensible human rights abuses. Such distinctions are not only
permitted and arguably required by the Act, they are also essential
to both the formation of a human rights culture in South Africa and
the promotion of national unity among South Africans.
I.AMNESTY: THE BEST WAY TO SECURE PEACE
AND CONFRONT THE PAST?
The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act
established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate
human rights abuses committed during the apartheid era.6 The
Commission provides an amnesty process as a means to elicit the
truth about South Africa's past.7 Although the amnesty process has
been widely criticized,8 South Africa was not in a position to
establish war crimes tribunals like those in Nuremberg or Tokyo.9 In
contrast to the situations in Germany and Japan at the end of World
War II, there was no clear victor in South Africa after apartheid.
There was also no incriminating paper trail left behind by the NP as
there had been by the Nazi Party. From the start of negotiations in
1990 until the elections of April 1994, the apartheid government
retained considerable control over the country's military and
economic resources and political violence still ravaged the
provinces." Given the substantial risk of violent retaliation, 12
6. Id. at ch. 2.
7. Id. at ch. 4.
8. See discussion infra Part VII.
9. See ASMAL ET AL., supra note 4, at 18; Interview with George Bizos, supra note 2;
Interview with Hanif Vally, Chief Legal Advisor to the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, in Cape Town, South Africa (Oct. 17, 1996) (on file with author). Justice
Goldstone, member of the Constitutional Court in South Africa and prosecutor of the
war crimes tribunal at the Hague, has also drawn this conclusion. Justice Goldstone,
Address at the University of Witwatersrand (Nov. 11, 1996).
10. The apartheid government destroyed most of its documentation just prior to the
elections. See Brigadier Cronje, Written Statement Submitted to the Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission 13 (Oct. 22, 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author);
see also Jeffrey Herbst, Truth May Do More Than Hurt as Apartheid Crimes Are Told, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 9, 1997, at M2 (noting that "[tihe protracted transition [from apartheid to
democracy] afforded [the apartheid officials] plenty of time to destroy the paper trails
leading to the brutality and bungling that were once so common").
11. Violence has been particularly prevalent in what are now referred to as the
Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal provinces. Of the 9325 deaths attributed to political
violence between July 1990 and June 1993, 51.0% of these deaths occurred in Gauteng
and 39.2% in KwaZulu-Natal. HRC SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, at 5.
12. According to Dr. Alex Boraine, vice-chairman of the Truth Commission, nego-
tiations between the apartheid government and the ANC would have collapsed and
"hundreds, possibly thousands, more innocent people would have died" had the ANC
not agreed to offer apartheid officials amnesty. Tony Freemantle, Crying for Justice,
HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 17, 1996, at Al.
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anti-apartheid organizations were hardly in a position to put the
South African Police ("SAP") and the South African Defense Forces
("SADF') on trial for their human rights abuses. There was also the
risk that many members of the SAP and SADF would simply flee the
country as many Nazis had after World War II.
Not only were war crimes trials poorly suited to South Africa's
situation, but they also consume an enormous amount of time and
money, and their results are often disappointing. For example, the
two ad hoc tribunals set up in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda
cost approximately eighty million dollars a year, and have suc-
ceeded in holding only one trial in three years.13 Most of the
Yugoslav and Rwandan war criminals remain free and are unlikely
to be arrested or extradited for prosecution.' In two years, the court
in Rwanda has managed to indict only twenty-one people of a pos-
sible 400, and in three years, the tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
has indicted only seventy-three people.'5 The high cost and ineffec-
tiveness of the tribunals have left the victims angry and weary."
In light of these discouraging examples, anti-apartheid activists
legitimately feared that criminal trials would produce few
convictions. This was especially true in South Africa given the
continuing presence of apartheid-era prosecutors and judges. In fact,
in October 1996, well-known apartheid-era prosecutor Tim McNally
failed to convict South Africa's former Defense Minister, Magnus
Malan, for a series of apartheid crimes, including murder.1 7 This
disturbing failure suggests that some of the offices of the attorneys
general of South Africa are still sympathetic to the old regime
and lack the objectivity to pursue the prosecution of former
apartheid officials rigorously. 8 South Africans are enraged that
13. Freemantle, supra note 12, at Al.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Tim McNally served as a prosecutor during the apartheid regime and
participated in the 1990 investigations of the Harms Commission that concluded there
were no government death squads. His record as a prosecutor suggests a history of
covering up the apartheid abuses of the SAP and SADF. It is alleged that his recent
failure to convict former Defense Minister General Magnus Malan and 17 other
members of the SADF and SAP resulted from McNally's refusal to call key state
witnesses. See ANC: Strange That McNally Won't Prosecute, CITIZEN, Oct. 29, 1996, at 4;
Farouk Chothia, Violence Victims Must Now Look to Civil Courts, Bus. DAY, Nov. 14,
1996, at 2. Malan was charged with the murder of thirteen people, including women
and children, and the attempted murder of four others in the KwaMakutha massacre
of January 27, 1987. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 25 (Mar.
1996).
18. Of course, prosecutorial loyalty to the apartheid regime may manifest itself in
failure to mount the strongest possible case against a former official, or failure to bring
charges altogether, despite the weight of the evidence against such an official.
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McNally's six-month prosecution of Magnus Malan cost taxpayers
R9 million and resulted in Malan's acquittal. 9 For the Commission,
his acquittal "demonstrate[s] [the Commission's] conviction that the
processes of the Commission offer a better prospect of establishing
the truth about [South Africa's] past than criminal trials."20
The difficulty of bringing successful prosecutions in a criminal
justice system largely controlled by members of the former apartheid
regime is but one reason for choosing the truth and reconciliation
route over war crimes trials. As the authors of a recent book about
the Truth Commission, entitled Reconciliation Through Truth, explain:
a judicial process would have focused too much on the
perpetrators to the exclusion of the victims; it would have
overly individualised the horrors of apartheid and pro-
vided merely a piecemeal picture of the past, at the
expense of necessary attention to its systemic and collec-
tive evils.21
South Africa's amnesty process is implicating more people in apart-
heid crimes and promoting more reconciliation than individual
prosecutions would have allowed,22 given the latter's narrow focus
and emphasis on revenge and punishment. The victims of apartheid
receive more attention in the amnesty hearings than they would
during criminal proceedings, and many find their participation in
the process cathartic.2 In addition, the report that the Truth Com-
mission must issue at the end of its term 24 will provide a more
19. Wyndham Hartley, Marathon Malan Trial Cost R9m, BUS. DAY, Nov. 14, 1996, at 5.
R9 million is approximately equivalent to two million U.S. dollars.
20. Statement by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Chairperson, and Dr. Alex Boraine, Vice
Chairperson of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission on the Outcome of the Malan Trial,
Truth and Reconciliation Commission Press Release, Oct. 11, 1996, available at
<http://www.truth.org.za/pr/p961011a.htm>.
21. ASMAL ET AL., supra note 4, at 19.
22. As of May 10, 1997, the Amnesty Committee had received 7700 applications.
7700 Amnesty Applications Received by Midnight Deadline Saturday, Reports from SAPA,
May 10, 1997, available at <http://www.truth.org.za/sapa9705/s970510g.htm>
[hereinafter Amnesty Applications].
23. For example, Thokozile Legina Dlamini found it helpful to the healing process
to testify about a shooting that occurred in her house in which six Inkatha Freedom
Party ("IFP") youths, including her daughter, died. See 'Why We Testified '---witnesses,
TRUTH TALK, THE OFFICIAL NEWSLETTER OF THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
COMMISSION (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Cape Town, South Africa), Nov.
1996, at 3.
24. The Commission is required to produce a final report three months after the
Commission has completed its work § 43(2) of Promotion of National Unity and Rec-
onciliation Act 34 of 1995. The date was originally scheduled to be in March 1998, but
it has been postponed until July 30, 1998, due to the large volume of applications.
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detailed and comprehensive account of South Africa's past than any
criminal court records could have provided.
There are other more practical justifications for an amnesty
process. The prosecution of crimes committed during a thirty-year
period would consume immense amounts of time and money from
a new country struggling to rebuild itself. Civil actions for monetary
damages likely would bankrupt political organizations and the
newly elected government. Forcing the new democratic government
to pay for the crimes of the apartheid regime would consume re-
sources needed to improve the country's economy, housing,
education, and health systems.25 In addition, there is the risk that
criminal prosecutions would target not only apartheid supporters,
but also "freedom fighters," which gave participants on all sides of
the struggle a pragmatic reason to support an amnesty process.26
Unlike criminal proceedings, South Africa's amnesty process
forces the apartheid regime to admit its abuses publicly and requires
perpetrators to reveal and discuss their crimes. Such confessions
compel the White population to acknowledge the atrocities
committed by the government they continuously re-elected.
27
Victims of the apartheid struggle also benefit from the process by
confronting their abusers, discovering what happened to their loved
ones, and telling their own stories. Entire communities may benefit
from the reparations process through improvements to their
education and health services. The final report of the Truth
Commission will create a public record of the human rights
violations, the violators, and the victims of the apartheid struggle.
As a result, no one will be able to make credible claims that the
reported incidents never happened.
Unfortunately, the Truth Commission's record to date arouses
skepticism about the likelihood of realizing these advantages.
Though the Amnesty Committee had received roughly 3500 appli-
cations by December 1996,2" about eighty percent of them had come
from prison inmates2 who had nothing to lose by applying. As of
Truth Panel Subpoenas Former President at Amnesty Deadline, AP, Sept. 30, 1997, available
in LEXIS, News Library, AP File.
25. For a discussion of why South Africa's resources are better spent on building a
solid future than compensating victims of the past struggle, see infra notes 82, 106.
26. In early December 1996, the Transvaal attorney general decided to pursue
roughly 35 murder cases against ANC members, leaving them struggling to meet the
December 14, 1996, deadline for amnesty applications. Sam Sole et al., Angry MK
Fighters Rush for Amnesty, SUNDAY INDEPENDENCE, Dec. 8, 1996, at 1.
27. See South Africa: Reconciliation and Steve Biko, ECONOMIST, Feb. 1, 1997, at 42.
28. South Africa; Truth Commission Issues Amnesty Statistics, Africa News, Dec. 6,
1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, AFRNWS File. December 14, 1996, was the
original deadline.
29. Brian Stuart, Tutu Threatens Again to Quit, CITIZEN, Nov. 5, 1996, at 2.
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May 10, 1997, the extended deadline for applications, the Committee
had received over 7700 applications0 and was having trouble proc-
essing them all.31 The Committee's size has been expanded from five
to thirteen members, and the March 1998 deadline for the Commit-
tee's report has been extended until July 1998.32 The NP has voiced
its opposition to any time extensions of the amnesty process,3 and
much of the public may find itself too emotionally exhausted to let
the process continue much longer than scheduled.
In addition, relatively few applications have been received from
senior members of the parties involved in the struggle.3 Some of
apartheid's key leaders, such as P.W. Botha, F.W. de Klerk, and
former Minister of Defense, Ma Vus Malan,u as well as the leader of
the IFP, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, have refused to apply for amnesty
and have insisted on their innocence. By contrast, more than forty
senior ANC leaders, including Deputy President Thabo Mbeki,
Defense Minister Joe Modise, and Justice Minister Dullah Omar,
have applied for amnesty.37 President Mandela's extension of the
deadline for amnesty applications from December 14, 1996, until
May 10, 199738 and his extension of the cut-off date for acts eligible
30. See Amnesty Applications, supra note 22. President Mandela agreed to extend the
deadline for amnesty applications from December 14, 1996, to May 10, 1997. See infra
note 35. Due to a bureaucratic glitch, the deadline was extended for a limited number
of people until September 30, 1997. Botha Subpoenaed by Panel, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Oct. 1, 1997, at A8.
31. See Amnesty Committee Faces Mammoth Task, Reports from SAPA, May 11, 1997,
available at <http://www.truth.org.za/sapa9705/s970511a.htm> [hereinafter Mam-
moth Task] (noting that Amnesty Committee chairman Judge Hassen Mall was "not
confident at all" that the Committee could process the applications in the 99 working
days left before the Committee's term ended in December 1997).
32. See Amnesty Applications, supra note 22; MPs Pass Amnesty Committee Enlarge-
ment Bill, Reports from SAPA, May 23, 1997, available at <http://www.truth.org.za/
sapa9705/s970523a.htm>; Truth Panel Subpeonas Former President at Amnesty Deadline,
supra note 24.
33. TRC Amnesty Process Must Not Drag on Beyond March Deadline, Reports from
SAPA, June 3, 1997, available at <http://www.truth.org.za/sapa9706/s970603e.htm>.
34. As of December 31, 1996, only two of the top leaders of the police and military
had applied for. amnesty: former law and order minister Adriaan Vlok, and former
police commissioner Johan van der Merwe. Robert Brand, TRC Worried as Deadline for
Amnesty Nears, STAR, Dec. 3, 1996, at 3. As of May 10, 1997, the final deadline for am-
nesty applications, only two former NP cabinet members had applied for amnesty,
namely Vlok and Piet Koornhof. Mammoth Task, supra note 31.
35. Suzanne Daley, Mandela Broadens Limits for Apartheid-Era Amnesty, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 1996, at A6. None of these men applied by the May 10, 1997, deadline.
36. See Amnesty Applications, supra note 22.
37. See Mammoth Task, supra note 31.
38. Lynn Duke, Mandela Buoys Truth Commission; Amnesty-for-Testimony Offering
Extended; Ex-General to Apply, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 1996, at A21. Although only Par-
liament can extend the application deadline and the cut-off date, Parliament is
expected to follow Mandela's wishes by amending the Act. The Cabinet agreed to
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for amnesty from December 6, 1993, until March 10, 199439 may have
brought forward a handful of prominent men such as the
Conservative leader of the Freedom Front,0 but the vast majority of
new applications came from lower-level officers and activists.
41
However, the Committee is beginning to hear disclosures from
amnesty applicants that are helping to solve past crimes42 and
implicating some of the top apartheid leaders.
Many of the "acts" the Amnesty Committee has considered
since it began sitting in May 1996 have involved known crimes."
This fact is disappointing given that one of the main justifications
for granting full criminal and civil indemnity is to uncover the
"truth" about the past. Letting the perpetrators of known crimes go
free does nothing to advance the goal of truth and often evokes
feelings of bitterness rather than reconciliation. Victims have found
the hearings particularly frustrating because they are seeking new
information about the fate of their loved ones, the whereabouts of
amend the Constitution to reflect the May 10, 1997, deadline for amnesty applications
in April 1997. Cabinet Approves Amnesty Closing Date of May 10, 1997, Reports from
SAPA, Apr. 30,1997, available at <http://www.truth.org.za/sapa9704/s970430chtn>.
39. Duke, supra note 38, at A21.
40. See id. General Constand Viljoen, leader of the Freedom Front and former
commander of the armed forces under apartheid, wanted to apply for amnesty for
plotting a coup against democracy in the spring of 1997, but was barred by the De-
cember 6, 1993, cut-off date. Now that the date has been extended, he intends to apply
for this act only. Id. He believes it is not "necessary" for members of the SADF to re-
quest amnesty for acts committed under "lawful orders" during "genuine military
operations." Viljoen Says He Won't Apply for Amnesty from the TRC, STAR, Nov. 18,
1996, at 2.
41. While the vast majority of applications filed just before the May 10, 1997, dead-
line came from anti-apartheid activists, only 20 to 30 of them came from former
apartheid police and defense force members. See Amnesty Applications, supra note 22.
Over 375 ANC applications and at least 140 Pan African Congress ("PAC") applica-
tions were submitted in time for the May 10, 1997, deadline, but neither the 500
applications promised by the ANC's KwaZulu-Natal structure, nor the 100 applica-
tions expected from the IFP materialized before the deadline passed. See ANC Submits
Amnesty Applications in Box, Reports from SAPA, May 10, 1997, available at
<http://www.truth.org.za/sapa9705/s97051c.htm>; Applications Reach 7000 Mark,
Reports from SAPA, May 10, 1997, available at <http://www.truth.org.za/sapa9705/
s970510d.htm>.
42. By the end of January 1997, the Amnesty Committee had received 135 con-
fessions from former apartheid policemen regarding over 200 murders. South African
Police Admit to 200 Apartheid-Era Killings, Agence France Presse, Jan. 30, 1997, available
in LEXIS, World Library, AFP File.
43. On some occasions, these instructions came from the highest ranking officials,
including P.W. Botha. Cronje, supra note 10, at 7.
44. TRC "Puzzle" Starts Falling into Place, TRUTH TALK, THE OFFICIAL NEWSLETTER
OF THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (Truth and Reconciliation Comrnis-
sion, Cape Town, South Africa), Nov. 1996, at 2.
Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 3:183
their remains, and the names of those responsible 45 rather than con-
firmation of what they already know. In addition, it is estimated that
the reported incidents will expose only twenty percent of apart-
46heid's worst crimes. Many South Africans may conclude that
listening to emotionally grueling testimony for a year and a half and
watching violent criminals go free was too high a price to pay for
such a small percentage of the "truth."47
Many victims would rather see their abusers pay for their
crimes through prison time and monetary damages and have ac-
tively opposed their abusers' amnesty applications.48 Unfortunately,
victims and their families must wait until at least July 1998 to see if
the Commission's final report designates them as "victims of gross
human rights violations" entitled to reparations. 49 Victims must then
wait until the President reviews the report and Parliament passes
implementing regulations.50 Given the government's budgetary
problems, victims are likely to find what reparations they do receive
grossly inadequate. Without sufficient reparations, victims may
question the value of the amnesty process, as "truth" alone
hardly compensates for or relieves their suffering. Many South
Africans, including one spokesperson for the Azanian People's
45. Id.
46. Journalist Max Dupre made this estimate during a National Public Radio
broadcast. All Things Considered (NPR radio broadcast, Dec. 13, 1996).
47. Every Sunday evening, the media televises a 30-minute program showing the
highlights of the amnesty hearings in which applicants explicitly discuss their crimes
and victims describe their ordeals. Jonathan Steele, Mandela: Three Years On, OB-
SERVER, May 4, 1997. One conservative editorial noted that "[iut would be difficult to
imagine anything more calculated to exacerbate race relations and create hatred
among blacks who daily hear of the atrocities committed by the white security forces."
Gwen Baragwanath, TRC Exacerbating Race Relations, CITIZEN, Nov. 22, 1996, at 19.
48. For example, Mrs. Elizabeth Maake opposed Officer van Vuuren's amnesty
application regarding the murder of her 18-year-old son in 1987. She contested that
van Vuuren's claim that her son was a double agent for the SAP and the ANC and
dismissed his testimony as "complete lies." Testimony of Brigadier J. Cronje, Colonel
R. Venter, Captain J. Hechter, Captain W. Mentz, and Warrant Officer P. van Vuuren
Before the Amnesty Committee (Oct. 22-Nov. 1, 1996) (unpublished transcript, on file
with author) [hereinafter Testimony of Security Police]. For a description of the
murder of Jackson Maake and his mother's opposition, see infra text accompanying
notes 228-245.
49. According to § 26(1) of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act
34 of 1995, any person who believes he or she has suffered harm as a result of a gross
violation of human rights may apply to the Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee
for reparations. By reparations, the Act does not contemplate the kind of compensa-
tion a court would order, but rather some rehabilitative measure for the victim, his or
her family, or the community. Such measures could include on-going traumatic stress
counseling, funding for the education of the children of the victims, or the building of
a school or community center. See § 26(1) of Promotion of National Unity and Recon-
ciliation Act 34 of 1995.
50. § 27 (1)-(3) of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995.
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Organization ("AZAPO"), a predominantly Black anti-apartheid
movement, already question the process and believe it shows that
"[tihe government has seen fit to sacrifice black Feople for the false
and flimsy peace of the white power structures."
It is difficult to declare 'unequivocally that an amnesty process
and a truth commission constituted the best way for South Africa to
secure peace and confront its past. There are risks associated with
choosing amnesty proceedings: (1) many of the worst human rights
abusers will not come forward; (2) some of apartheid's most heinous
crimes will remain unsolved; (3) without substantial reparations,
victims will become more embittered rather than less; and (4) South
Africans from all ethnic and political groups will question the
legitimacy of their democratic government and find reconciliation
impossible without receiving some form of justice. Though these
risks are daunting, there were equally high if not higher risks
associated with establishing an international war crimes tribunal or
pursuing domestic prosecutions. Now that the deadline for amnesty
applications has passed, South Africa's Minister of Justice has
declared the attorneys-general "duty-bound to prosecute perpetrators
of apartheid-era crimes who have not applied" to the Amnesty
Committee "if sufficient evidence for a case to be made exist[s].
" 2
The Human Rights Commission of South Africa "urges the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission to throw its weight behind the
prosecuting authorities in bringing to account those responsible for
undeclared human rights violations. 5 3 Given the political choices
facing South Africa and its military and financial realities, this Note
concludes that some form of an amnesty process was the most
viable means of bringing the nation to terms with its past and
securing peace and democracy for the future.
II.THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION ACT: A WISE OR NECESSARY
INTERPRETATION OF THE EPILOGUE TO THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION?
During the final drafting of the interim Constitution in 1993, the
negotiators agreed to commit South Africa to an amnesty process in
order to secure passage of the much awaited Constitution.5 4 This
commitment was incorporated into the epilogue of the interim
51. See Granting Amnesty to Coetzee a Bitter Reality to Many: AZAPO, Reports from
SAPA, Aug. 5, 1997, available at <http://www.truth.org.za/sapa9708/s970805b.htrn>
[hereinafter Bitter Reality].
52. AGs Now Duty-Bound to Prosecute Apartheid Era Criminals: Omar, Reports from
SAPA, May 11, 1997, available at <http://www.truth-org.za/sapa9705/s970511b.hm>.
53. HRC Urges Truth Body to Support Human Rights Prosecutions, Reports from
SAPA, May27, 1997, available at <http://www.truth.org.za/sapa9705/s970527c.hn>.
54. Interview with George Bizos, supra note 2.
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Constitution, which explicitly requires Parliament to pass an am-
nesty law without prescribing a particular amnesty process.
This Constitution provides a historic bridge between
the past of a deeply divided society characterized by strife,
conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future
founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy
and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities
for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class,
belief or sex.
The pursuit of national unity, the well-being of all
South African citizens and peace require reconciliation
between the people of South Africa and the reconstruction
of society.
The adoption of this Constitution lays the secure
foundation for the people of South Africa to transcend the
divisions and strife of the past, which generated gross
violations of human rights, the transgression of humani-
tarian principles in violent conflicts and a legacy of hatred,
fear, guilt and revenge.
These can now be addressed on the basis that there is
a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for
reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not
for victimization.
In order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction,
amnesty shall be granted in respect of acts, omissions and
offenses associated with political objectives and committed in the
course of the conflicts of the past. To this end, Parliament under
this Constitution shall adopt a law determining a firm cut-off
date, which shall be a date after 8 October 1990 and before 6
December 1993, and providing for the mechanisms, criteria and
procedures, including tribunals, if any, through which such
amnesty shall be dealt with at any time after the law has been
passed.
With this Constitution and these commitments we,
the people of South Africa, open a new chapter in the his-
tory of our country."'
The idea expressed in the epilogue originated in early 1990
when de Klerk's government agreed to consider the release of
55. S. AFR. CONST. of 1994 National Unity and Reconciliation (emphasis added).
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political prisoners who had been convicted of common law crimes.'
The government began formally discussing the release of political
prisoners with the ANC at Groote Schuur in May 1990. In the Groote
Schuur Minute that came out of the meeting, the parties agreed that
political prisoners would be released and established a working
group that would make recommendations on how to define political
prisoners and establish procedures for their release.5 7 The Indemnity
Act of 1990 and the November 1990 Guidelines for Defining Political
Offences in South Africa,s issued by the apartheid government,
adopted many of the working group's recommendations; 6° many
ANC prisoners were released under their terms and those of
subsequent regulations 6' issued by the apartheid government.62 The
Act offered either temporary immunity or permanent indemnity to
persons who committed political acts prior to October 8, 1990, and
who were in prison, undergoing prosecution, or likely to face
prosecution in the future. Many political exiles sought and obtained
temporary immunity from prosecution to permit their safe return to
South Africa63
The 1990 indemnity provisions were passed under the rationale
that effective political negotiations between the apartheid govern-
ment and its opposition could not take place without releasing anti-
apartheid leaders from prison and allowing prominent political
exiles to return. This rationale differs markedly from the rationale
behind the amnesty provisions of the Truth and Reconciliation Act.
These amnesty provisions are designed to encourage people to come
forward and disclose the criminal acts that they committed during
the apartheid era so that the nation may know the truth about its
past. Without the inducement of indemnity from criminal and civil
liability, few people would voluntarily reveal such information.
While members of the resistance movement, many of whom had
56. See Raylene Keightley, Political Offenses and Indemnity in South Africa, 9 S. AFR. J.
HUM. RTs. 334, 337 (1993).
57. The Groote Schuur Minute, May 4, 1990, ' 1.1.
58. Indemnity Act 35 of 1990.
59. GN R2625 of 7 November 1990.
60. See discussion of the working group's recommendations, infra notes 146, 147,
150.
61. See, e.g., GN R310 of 24 April 1991; GN R501 of 6 March 1991; GN R3013 of 18
December 1990.
62. Under de Klerk's program of general remission for first-time offenders, an es-
timated 60,000 prisoners were released. Keightley, supra note 56, at 349 n.89. These
figures "probably incorporated all those released under three separate amnesties on 10
December 1990, 30 April 1991, and 1 July 1991." Id.
63. For instance, the apartheid government granted temporary immunity from
prosecution to 117 formerly exiled ANC members. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE,
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 32 (May 1995).
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only committed the "crime" of opposing the apartheid government,
primarily benefited from the Indemnity Act of 1990, members of the
SAP and SADF who committed atrocious crimes in the name of the
NP are likely to benefit most from the amnesty provisions of the
Truth and Reconciliation Act. In effect, the concept of indemnity or
amnesty, once used to rectify injustices committed against the ANC,
has become a mechanism for ensuring that many of apartheid's
functionaries will never have to pay for those injustices.
As negotiations between the apartheid government and the
resistance movements led by the ANC progressed during 1991 and
1992, the idea of a political amnesty became a much discussed
component of a political settlement." In October 1992, the resistance
movement asserted that it would not accept a settlement predicated
on the apartheid government granting its officials a blanket,
automatic amnesty. That same month, the apartheid government
had passed the Further Indemnity Act of 1992 which gave de Klerk
almost unlimited discretion to grant amnesty to whomever he
chose." This Act sent a warning to the resistance movement that the
apartheid government was attempting to achieve reconciliation
through a forgetting of the past and an exoneration of apartheid
functionaries. Throughout the constitutional negotiations of 1993
and the parliamentary debates of 1994 and 1995 which led to the
passage of the Truth and Reconciliation Act, the NP continued to
demand an automatic amnesty for members of the apartheid
regime. 7 In the end, the NP's pressure resulted in the inclusion in
the interim Constitution of the requirement that Parliament pass an
amnesty law, but the resistance movement managed to defeat the
Party's attempts to secure a general automatic amnesty in the text of
the interim Constitution and the Truth and Reconciliation Act.
When it came time to establish the required amnesty law,
members of the new Cabinet and Parliament found themselves
deeply divided. Getting the Act passed took months and required
intense debates and tough compromises.8 The length of time needed
64. See Lynn Berat, South Africa: Negotiating Change?, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 267, 267-77 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed.,
1995).
65. ASMAL ET AL., supra note 4, at 51.
66. Ch. I § 2, ch. II § 3 of Further Indemnity Act 151 of 1992.
67. ASMAL ET AL., supra note 4, at 17. The NP also insisted on the validity of secret
indemnities granted to 3500 policemen and two former Cabinet Ministers a few days
before the 1994 democratic elections. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, MONTHLY REPORT
1 (Jan. 1995). On January 23, 1995, the ANC-dominated Cabinet declared these in-
demnities invalid because they did not specify the political crimes for which
indemnity had been sought and granted. Id.
68. When the original draft of the Act reached Parliament, it was debated for over
150 hours in committee and underwent 100 amendments. HUMAN RIGHTS COM-
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to pass the Act reflects the contentious nature of its provisions. Some
of the more controversial issues surrounding the amnesty provisions
were: who should be eligible for amnesty; how to define "acts
associated with a political objective;" whether perpetrators who
made full disclosure would receive an automatic amnesty; and
whether the amnesty hearings would be open to the public. 9 At one
stage, the NP's opposition to public amnesty hearings led to a
Cabinet compromise that the hearings would be closed to the
public.7 The Act which eventually passed in June 1995 kept the
amnesty hearings open to the public unless the Committee
determined that it would not be safe or "in the interest of justice" to
hold a public hearing"7' Had Parliament succumbed to the pressure
of the NP and permitted closed hearings, it would have undermined
the whole purpose of the Truth and Reconciliation Act which is to
expose the truth to the general public.
The drafters, who included prominent advocates such as
George Bizos and Wim Trengove from the Legal Resources Center,
wanted to ensure that the Truth Commission, particularly its
Amnesty Committee, would have real power, and that the amnest
criteria would not be mere formalities but would have "teeth."
Although the Truth and Reconciliation Act does not offer a blanket
amnesty, the amnesty it provides is quite broad. Pursuant to the
epilogue's vague instruction that amnesty be granted for "acts,
omissions and offenses associated with political objectives and
committed in the course of the conflicts of the past," Parliament
established three relatively simple criteria for amnesty applications.
In order to obtain amnesty, an applicant must fall within one of
several categories of eligible applicants," demonstrate that he has
committed "an act associated with a political objective" between
March 1, 1960, and May 10, 1994, 74 and fully disclose all the relevant
MITTEE, supra note 17, at 16. The National Assembly passed a much amended bill on
May 17, 1995, and the Senate passed a further amended bill on June 27, 1995, to which
the National Assembly agreed on June 28, 1995. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, supra
note 63, at 6; HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 5 Uune 1995). The
Act was later signed on December 15, 1995. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, supra note
17, at 16-17.
69. See HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, MONTHLY REPORT 1 (Nov. 1994) [hereinafter
MONTHLY REPORT (Nov. 1994)]; HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, MONTHLY REPORT 8
(Apr. 1995) [hereinafter MONTHLY REPORT (Apr. 1995)]; HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE,
supra note 17, at 16.
70. See MONTHLY REPORT 1-2 (Nov. 1994), supra note 69.
71. § 33(1)(b)(i) of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995.
72. Interview with George Bizos, supra note 2.
73. See discussion infra Part III.
74. See discussion infra Part IV.
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facts pertaining to this "political" act.7 If an applicant satisfies these
three requirements, he is entitled to a grant of amnesty that will
indemnify him against all criminal and civil liability arising from the
"political" act.76
The effect of a grant of amnesty depends on whether the appli-
cant had been convicted of a crime or held liable for a civil
judgment. If an amnesty recipient has already been convicted and
sentenced for a crime, the conviction is erased from the record and
the applicant is released from jail immediately.7 If a civil judgment
has already been entered against the applicant and the applicant
subsequently receives amnesty, the civil judgment remains valid
and the applicant must comply with its terms.8 If the applicant faces
criminal prosecution, the prosecution is usually postponed until the
outcome of the amnesty proceedings; if the applicant receives am-
nesty, the prosecution is dropped.' If the applicant has been sued for
civil damages, the judge overseeing the civil case has the discretion
to postpone the proceedings until the Amnesty Committee has
reached a decision.8 Should the applicant receive amnesty during a
postponement, the civil case is dismissed and the victim is barred
from recovering any civil damages from the applicant.81
Although the amnesty provisions of the Act offer both criminal
and civil indemnity to human rights abusers, nothing in the
language of the epilogue required this, and other sections of the
interim Constitution arguably forbid it. In Azanian Peoples
Organization (AZAPO) v. President of the Republic of South Africa,"2
several victims of the apartheid struggle" challenged the criminal
75. See discussion infra Part V.
76. § 20(7)(a) of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995.
77. Id. §§ 20(8), (10).
78. Id. § 20(9).
79. Id. §§ 19(7), 20(8).
80. Id. § 19(6).
81. Id. § 20(7)(a).
82. Azanian Peoples Org. (AZAPO) v. President of Republic of South Africa, 1996
(4) SALR 671 (CC).
83. Those bringing the case included the families of Steven Biko, Griffiths Mxenge
and Fabien and Florence Ribeiro. Steven Biko, leader of the Black Consciousness
Movement, was taken into custody by the SAP in early September 1977 in Port Eliza-
beth. He was driven, naked, and unconscious in the back of a Land Rover from Port
Elizabeth to Pretoria prison, a distance of 750 miles, and died on Sept. 12 from brain
damage. Tony Freemantle, Crying for Justice; Widow of Steven Biko Has Not Found Rest,
HOUS. CHRoN., Nov. 18, 1996, at A13. Griffiths Mxenge was an ANC human rights
lawyer from Durban killed in 1981 by members of Vlakplaas, including Dirk Coetzee,
Almond Mofomela, and David Tshikilange. The Durban High Court convicted the
three men for Mxenge's murder on May 15, 1997, but on August 4, 1997, they were
granted amnesty. The family of Mxenge is seeking a review of the case and a recusal
of the whole amnesty committee. Coetzee Gets Amnesty, But Mxenge Murder
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and civil indemnity provisions of the Truth and Reconciliation Act
as violations of section 22 and section 35(1) of the interim
Constitution. Section 22 provides that "[e]very person shall have the
right to have justiciable disputes settled by a court of law or, where
appropriate, another independent or impartial forum." Section
35(1) requires all South African courts to consult applicable
international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution, which includes section 22.5 The petitioners in the
AZAPO case argued that the Amnesty Committee was neither "a
court of law" nor an "independent forum" as required by section 22
and therefore the Committee was not authorized to settle "justiciable
disputes." 6 In addition, the petitioners claimed South Africa had
international legal obligations under the Geneva Conventions of
194987 and Protocol I of 1977g to prosecute "war crimes, crimes
Masterminds Still Free, Reports from SAPA, Aug. 4, 1997, available at
<http://www.truth.org.za/sapa9708/s970804g.htm> [hereinafter Murder Master-
minds]. Fabian Ribeiro and his wife Florence were prominent ANC activists residing in
Mamelodi when they were killed on December 1, 1986. Mr. Ribeiro had been recruit-
ing young men for military training by the ANC and had given medical assistance
to anti-apartheid activists. Army Murdered Anti-Apartheid Doctor, Truth Commission
Told, Agence France Presse, Oct. 30, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, AFP File.
Captain Hechter, one of five security policemen who applied for amnesty in October
1996, disclosed his knowledge and involvement in the murders during amnesty pro-
ceedings held in October 1996 and February 1997. Stephen Laufer, SADF Man Derailed
Ribeiro Probe, Commission Is Told, BUS. DAY, Oct. 31, 1996, at 1.
84. S. AFR. CONST. § 22 (1994).
85. Id. § 35(1). This section permits, but does not require, courts to consult compa-
rable foreign case law as well. According to § 39(1)(b)-(c) of the final Constitution,
courts "must consider international law" and "may consider foreign law."
86. AZAPO, 1996 (4) SALR at 681.
87. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 74 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention I]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed- Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135
[hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; and Convention Relative to the Protection of Ci-
vilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. The Geneva Conventions I, II, III, and IV will
hereinafter collectively be referred to as the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
88. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I]. According to the petitioners, Protocol I ap-
plied to South Africa because international law has recognized the struggle against
apartheid as an "international conflict involving a fight for self determination." Appli-
cants' Heads of Argument at 21, Azanian Peoples Org. (AZAPO) v. President of
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (4) SALR 671 (CC) (on file with author). This brief was
submitted by advocates David Soggot and Modise Khoza to the Constitutional Court
of South Africa on May 27, 1996.
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against humanity, crimes of apartheid and crimes of genocide."89
The Constitutional Court rejected both of petitioners' arguments,
holding that the amnesty provisions violated neither section 22 nor
applicable international law under section 35(1).90
The Court's analysis of South Africa's international legal duties
was both dismissive and slightly disingenuous. The Court con-
cluded that the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol I did not
apply to the apartheid struggle91 even though Protocol I refers
explicitly to apartheid as a "grave breach"92 and the U.N. General
Assembly had passed resolutions urging states to apply the Geneva
Conventions to persons in the struggle against apartheid.93 The
Court pointed to the different truth and reconciliation approaches
adopted by Chile, El Salvador, and Argentina as evidence that inter-
national law does not forbid South Africa's amnesty process.'
However, the Court failed to mention that in 1992, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights ruled that the amnesty
laws in El Salvador, Argentina, and Uruguay violated international
89. Applicants' Heads of Argument, supra note 88, at 19. Although not referred to
specifically in AZAPO, many international documents impose duties to prosecute and
punish human rights violations. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, arts. V-VI, 78 U.N.T.S. 227 [hereinafter Genocide
Convention]; International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of Apartheid, Nov. 30, 1973, arts. IV(b)-V, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No.
30, at 75, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 50 (1974) [hereinafter Apart-
heid Convention]; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. IV, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at
197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) [hereinafter Convention Against Torture]; Inter-
American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, Dec. 9, 1985, art. VI, 25 I.L.M.
519. Some scholars contend that customary international law imposes a duty to punish
grave violations of physical integrity. See, e.g., Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts:
The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537,
2585 ("While not conclusive, the frequent reiteration of a duty to punish grave viola-
tions of physical integrity in international instruments is evidence that the duty is-or is
emerging as-a customary norm.").
90. Azanian Peoples Org. (AZAPO) v. President of Republic of South Africa, 1996
(4) SALR 671, 691-93 (CC).
91. Id. at 689 n.29.
92. Protocol I, supra note 88, art. 85(4)(c) (defining grave breaches to include
"practices of apartheid and other inhuman and degrading practices involving outrages
upon personal dignity, based on racial discrimination"); Applicants' Heads of Argu-
ment, supra note 88, at 22.
93. See, e.g., GA Res. 3103, U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 142, U.N. Doc.
A/9030 (1973); GA Res. 2506(A), U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 23, U.N.
Doc. A/7630 (1969); GA Res. 2396, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No.18, at 19, U.N.
Doc. A/7218 (1968); GA Res. 2383, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No.18, at 58, U.N.
Doc. A/7218 (1968).
94. See Applicants' Heads of Argument, supra note 88, at 22-23.
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law 95 and that Chile's amnesty decree barred only criminal prosecu-
tions, not civil damage actions by victims.96 More importantly, the
fact that other countries have violated their international duty to
prosecute war crimes by passing sweeping amnesty laws does not
render South Africa's amnesty process valid under international
law.
Like the Constitutional Court, the authors of Reconciliation
Through Truth defend South Africa's amnesty process on the basis of
"the diversity of approaches" nations have pursued in order to come
to terms with their past.97 The authors claim that nothing in
international law obliges states to prosecute human rights abusers
when doing so would risk "reducing the body politic to ashes.""
This contention contradicts the finding of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights that El Salvador's amnesty violated
El Salvador's international legal obligations "regardless of any
necessity that the peace negotiations might pose." 99 Diane
Orentlicher agrees with the authors of Reconciliation Through Truth
that "international law does not.., require states to take action that
poses a serious threat to vital national interests," but she adds that "a
state cannot evade its duty to punish atrocious crimes merely to
appease disaffected military forces or to promote national
reconciliation."'0 While it is quite possible that South Africa would
have gone up in flames in 1993 if the resistance movement had not
agreed to some form of amnesty process, it is less clear that the
ANC-dominated Parliament's decision to pass a sweeping amnesty
law in June 1995 and the Amnesty Committee's current decisions to
release brutal murderers from jail were necessary to ensure South
Africa's survival. Since these latter decisions seem to be motivated
more by concerns for political expediency and national
reconciliation, they render the Constitutional Court's finding that
95. Report No. 28/92 (Argentina), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41, OEA/ser. L/V/II.83 doc.
24 (1992); Report No. 26/92 (El Salvador), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 83, OEA/ser. L/V/I1.83
doc. 25 (1992); Report No. 29/92 (Uruguay), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 154, OEA/ser.
L/V/II.83 doc. 25 (1992).
96. See Jorge Mera, Chile: Truth and Justice Under the Democratic Government, in
IMPuNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 64,
at 171, 179. The Chilean decree granted amnesty for crimes, including "all murders,
mayhem, batteries, unlawful detention, kidnappings, disappearances, and torture
committed by agents of the state during the period of martial law imposed after the
coup, which lasted from September 1973 until March 1978." Id. at 179.
97. ASMAL ET AL., supra note 4, at 20.
98. Id.
99. Margaret Popkin, El Salvador: A Negotiated End to Impunity?, in IMPUNITY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 64, at 198, 212.
100. Orentlicher, supra note 89, at 2595.
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international law permits South Africa's broad amnesty provisions
questionable.
The Constitutional Court's conclusion that the amnesty provi-
sions do not violate the terms of the interim Constitution is also
subject to criticism on substantive constitutional grounds. Granting
criminal and civil indemnity to human rights abusers arguably vio-
lates the section 22 right of every South African "to have justiciable
disputes settled by a court of law or, where appropriate, another in-
dependent or impartial forum."'01 The Constitution does not tolerate
this kind of violation unless, as section 33(2) explains, some other
provision in the Constitution permits the violation, or the violation
can be justified under section 33(1) as "reasonable and justifiable in
an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality."' 2
The Constitutional Court found that the epilogue of the Constitution
permitted the section 22 violation and therefore concluded that the
Court did not need to do a section 33(1) analysis. The key issues in
the AZAPO case were whether the Constitution authorized Parlia-
ment to indemnify individuals from both criminal'" and civil
liability ° and to indemnify the state of any potential civil liability.
0 6
The Court held that the epilogue gave Parliament constitutional
authority to pass these broad amnesty provisions because the epi-
logue envisioned an amnesty "in its most comprehensive and
generous meaning" in order to promote national union and recon-
ciliation.1 7
Justice Mohamed, the author of the AZAPO opinion, concedes
that the negotiators of the Constitution, the leaders of the nation,
and ultimately Parliament did have choices and could have drafted
an amnesty law in many different ways:
[t]hey could have chosen to insist that a comprehensive
amnesty manifestly involved an inequality of sacrifice
101. S. AFR. CONST. § 22.
102. Id. § 33(1), (2).
103. Azanian Peoples Org. (AZAPO) v. President of Republic of South Africa, 1996
(4) SALR 671, 698 (CC).
104. See id. at 683-91. The Court concludes that this type of amnesty is permissible
under the Constitution and that international law is therefore irrelevant to the consti-
tutional inquiry. The Court goes on to say that even if international law were relevant
to the constitutional analysis, indemnifying persons from criminal liability is permissi-
ble under international law.
105. Id. at 691-94. The Court rejects the argument that § 20(7) violates the victim's
right to recover damages from a wrongdoer for unlawful acts committed between
1960-1993.
106. Id. at 694-97 (Concluding that Parliament was authorized by the Constitution to
relieve the state of any civil liability especially given South Africa's scarce resources).
107. Id. at 698.
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between the victims and the perpetrators of invasions into
the fundamental rights of such victims and their families,
and that, for this reason, the terms of the amnesty should
leave intact the claims which some of these victims might
have been able to pursue against those responsible for
authorising, permitting or colluding in such acts, or they
could have decided that this course would impede the
pace, effectiveness and objectives of the transition with
consequences substantially prejudicial for the people of a
country facing, for the first time, the real prospect of en-
joying, in the future, some of the human rights so unfairly
denied to the generations that preceded them .... They
could conceivably have chosen to differentiate between the
wrongful acts committed in defence of the old order and
those committed in the resistance of it, or they could have
chosen a comprehensive form of amnesty which did not
make this distinction.0 8
The Constitutional Court unanimously concluded that
Parliament was entitled to make the choices that it did: to indemnify
amnesty recipients against both criminal and civil liability even
though such indemnity deprives victims of their rights; to make all
wrongful political acts eligible for amnesty regardless of the political
affiliation of the actor; and to indemnify the state against all civil
liability arising out of such acts even when the state is the only
potential source of financial compensation for the victims. Because
nothing in the language of the epilogue compelled the Court to
reach this result, the Court's conclusions were clearly based on
political rather than legal grounds. For this reason, many, including
the author of this Note, still question the necessity and
appropriateness of these conclusions.
III.WHO SHOULD BE ELIGIBLE FOR AMNESTY?.
One of the choices that faced the drafters of the Truth and Rec-
onciliation Act was who should be eligible for amnesty. According
to section 20(2), a person is eligible for amnesty if he or she
"advised, planned, directed, commanded, ordered or committed" an
"act associated with a political objective"1' 9 "within or outside the
Republic"' "0 during the period between March 1, 1960, and May 10,
108. Id.
109. See discussion infra Part IV.
110. Section 20(2) makes eligible for amnesty acts that were committed or planned
"within or outside the Republic." § 20(2) of Promotion of National Unity and
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1994, and he or she fits into one of the group of persons defined in
subsections 20(2)(a)-(g). The Act explicitly makes eligible all persons
who were in any way involved in the commission of a political act
that constituted a criminal offense or delict. The people who gave
orders and those who followed them are equally eligible for am-
nesty.
Subsections 20(2)(a)-(g) list the seven groups of persons eligible
for amnesty. The first eligible group of persons includes "any
member or supporter of a publicly known organisation or liberation
movement" who either planned, ordered, or committed a political
act "on behalf of or in support of such organisation or movement,
bona fide in furtherance of a political struggle waged by such
organisation or movement against the State or any former state or
another publicly known political organisation or liberation
movement." '' This subsection covers not only freedom fighters and
supporters of apartheid, but also members of political organizations
such as the IFP who committed crimes against other political
organizations such as the ANC. Arguably, these latter acts could
have been excluded from the amnesty process because they did not
Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995. The fact that the amnesty provisions extend to acts
committed outside of South Africa has generated heated debate. Some critics argue
that South Africa cannot indemnify persons who committed crimes in foreign territory
from all criminal and civil liability. They claim that if a foreign country desires to
prosecute or a foreign citizen intends to sue for damages, under international law
South Africa cannot deny the foreign state, nor its citizens, the right to bring an action
by refusing extradition. Supporters of the provision argue that South Africa could
legitimately refuse to extradite persons found to have committed political acts under
the amnesty criteria if they fall within a political offenses exceptions in an extradition
treaty.
Although the terms of the Act appear to authorize a refusal to extradite, in No-
vember 1996, Minister of Justice Dullah Omar signed an extradition order for two
right-wing activists wanted for murder and other crimes committed in Namibia. He
explained that "South Africa cannot grant amnesty for offenses committed in other
countries" and that international law obliged South Africa to comply with Narmibia's
request because both countries belong to the Commonwealth and the Southern Afri-
can Development Community which have automatic extradition agreements. Prakash
Naidoo, Apartheid Agents Face Extradition for Their Crimes Abroad, SUNDAY INDE-
PENDENCE, Dec. 1, 1996, at 3. While Omar's statements suggest that South Africa is
willing to extradite persons who have committed crimes abroad even if they receive
amnesty, there is reason to believe that the response might be different under an ex-
tradition treaty with a political offense exception.
111. § 20(2)(a) of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995.
This group of persons clearly includes members and supporters of well-known politi-
cal groups such as the ANC, the PAC, the IFP, AZAPO, the South African Communist
Party ("SACP"), the United Democratic Front ("UDF"), the South African Students
Congress ("SASCO"), the African Democratic Christian Party ("ADCP"), the Demo-
cratic Party ("DP"), the Afrikaner Weerstandbewiging ("AWB"), the Freedom Front
("FF"), the Conservative Party ("CP"), and the NP.
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arise from a direct confrontation between apartheid supporters and
resisters.
The second category of eligible persons includes "any employee
of the State or any former state or any member of the security forces
of the State or any former state" who committed a political act
in the course and scope of his or her duties and within the
scope of his or her express or implied authority... against
a publicly known organisation or liberation movement en-
gaged in a political struggle against the State or a former
state or against any members or supporters of such organi-
sation or movement,... bona fide with the ob)ect of
countering or otherwise resisting the said struggle."
This category of persons includes officials of the apartheid
government and members of the SAP and SADF who planned,
ordered, or committed crimes or delicts against the property or
membership of resistance groups."' While the language of this
section excludes the crimes of rogue officials, (i.e., state personnel
who acted outside of their authority and abused their power to
commit crimes against people on the basis of their skin color or their
real or perceived affiliation with liberation groups), it remains to be
seen whether the Amnesty Committee will interpret the language to
permit such distinctions. Presumably, an applicant can easily argue
that he or she was acting on the basis of "implied" authority and
with the "bona fide" goal of protecting the state.
Subsection 20(2)(f) makes this argument easier by extending
eligibility to "any person referred to in paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and
(d), who on reasonable grounds believed that he or she was acting in the
scope of his or her duties and within the scope of his or her express or
implied authority."' Subsection 20(2)(d) is basically identical to
subsection 20(2)(b) regarding state employees except that it covers
"any employee or member of a publicly known political
organisation or liberation movement" who acted within his or her
duty or authority to further a struggle against the State or an Y
former state or any publicly known political organization.
Subsection 20(2)(c) covers employees of the State or any former state
who acted within their duty or authority against each other (e.g.,
employees of the apartheid regime acting against Lesotho or the
112. Id. § 20(2)(b).
113. Examples include the ANC, PAC, SACP, AZAPO, SASCO, and UDF. See supra
note 111.
114. § 20(2)(f) of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995
(emphasis added).
115. Id. § 20(2)(d).
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Ciskei or vice versa)., 6 Even though subsection 20(2)(f) gives the
Committee the discretion to decide if the employee or member of the
political organization, State, or former state indeed had "reasonable
grounds" for believing their crime fell within the scope of their
duties and authority, State employees should have little trouble
making this argument given the wide range of powers permitted
and exercised by the apartheid State. 7 The Amnesty Committee
should interpret "reasonable grounds" narrowly to ensure that
people who abused their power remain criminally and civilly liable.
Subsection 20(2)(e) includes eligibility for "any person in the
performance of a coup d'etat to take over the government of any
former state, or in any attempt thereto.""" This section arguably in-
cludes any MK guerrilla action against the State or anything
comparable to General Viljoen's planned, though never executed,
coup against democracy in the spring of 1994. Subsection 20(2)(g) is
a catch-all provision which covers "any person who associated him-
self or herself with any act or omission committed for the purposes
referred to in paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f)."119 Anyone who
can establish an "association" with any publicly known organiza-
tion, liberation movement, State or former state, coup d'etat, or
person who had reasonable grounds for believing they were acting
within the boundaries of their duties and authority may qualify for
amnesty. It is unclear whether "associating" oneself with a group
requires more than mere self-identification. If the Act requires only
self-identification, such claims will be nearly impossible to refute.
George Bizos, who helped draft the provisions in question,
maintains that the Act does not permit individuals to make such
claims. ° In fact, the requirement that the alleged political acts have
been committed on behalf of a publicly known-as opposed to secret
or fictitious-organization was included explicitly to disallow such
mala fide applications. In a recent decision of the Amnesty Com-
mittee, two far right-wing Afrikaners who claimed they belonged to
the National Socialist Partisans were denied amnesty because the
group consisted of only four members and did not constitute a
116. Id. § 20(2)(c).
117. In its submission to the Truth Commission, the Democratic Party gave a history
of the many apartheid laws that granted state actors wide powers to oppress, arrest,
and detain opponents of the state. See Democratic Party, Submission to the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission 13-14 (Aug. 20, 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author). These laws include the Riotous Assemblies Act of 1956, the Unlawful
Organizations Act of 1960, the Terrorism Act of 1967, and the Internal Security Act of
1976, which was later consolidated into the Internal Security Act of 1982.
118. § 20(2)(e) of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995.
119. Id. § 20(2)(g).
120. See Interview with George Bizos, supra note 2.
121. Id.
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"publicly known organization." '122 Subsection 20(2)(f), however, still
appears to allow an individual or a group of individuals to feign an
"association" with one of the legitimate groups or political purposes
listed under subsections (a)-(g).
The eligibility criteria in section 20(2) have been criticized for
not drawing a distinction between freedom fighters and the perpe-• •123
trators of apartheid's human rights abuses. The authors of the
book Reconciliation Through Truth insist that the Act requires the
Commission to make "moral" distinctions between apartheid sup-
porters and resisters in order to fulfill the goal of "restoration of the
human and civil dignity of victims of human rights violations.'
124
Furthermore,
[t]o decline a moral condemnation when the full facts
scream exactly for that is to join in a business of exculpa-
tion; it is to put on intentionally or otherwise, the garb of
the apologist. It is to enter upon not merely a moral di-
lemma, but actual immorality .... This cannot be achieved
by suggesting to victims of apartheid abuses that the thing
they were fighting against was morally indistinguishable
from what they were fighting for. The world was certainly
under no such illusion.
While the Act certainly permits the Truth Commission to make
moral judgments and distinctions in its written account of the past,
it is less clear that the Act allows the Amnesty Committee to make
such distinctions in its decisions to grant or deny amnesty. The
authors of Reconciliation Through Truth argue that the Committee
could and should impose a contrition requirement in order to make
such distinctions.26
122. Four South African Bombers Get Amnesty, Reuters Financial Wire, Dec. 12, 1996,
available in LEXIS, World Library, REUFIN File.
123. See generally ANC: We Don't Owe Apology to FW, CITIZEN, Nov. 4, 1996, at 1-2
(noting that AZAPO and members of the ANC have resisted attempts to equate the
struggle against apartheid with the struggle to maintain apartheid and do not think
freedom fighters should have to appear before the Truth Commission); Sharon Chetty,
The Amnesty Squabble, SOWETAN, Nov. 8, 1996, at 10 (quoting ANC Mpumalanga Pre-
mier Mathews Phosa, "It is a matter of commonsense about how this should be looked
at, . .. you cannot equate the two sides in any way."); Dr. Motsoko Pheko (Deputy
Pres., PAC), Don't Equate APLA with Right-Wing, CITIZEN, Nov. 6, 1996, at 19 (arguing
that "[i]t is a travesty of justice and a misrepresentation of facts, both historically and
legally... to equate [Azanian People's Liberation Army] activities with those of the
Right-wing").
124. ASMAL ET AL., supra note 4, at 16 (quoting the S. AFR. CONST. preamble).
125. Id.
126. See id. at 17. In their view, "the Act leaves it ample room, in practice and should
the need arise, to ensure that victims are not subject to the indignity and new pain of
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The position of author Kader Asmal regarding the treatment of
freedom fighters and apartheid perpetrators has recently changed.
During his twenty-seven years in exile, Asmal "campaigned for a
South African equivalent of the Nuremberg trials...,,27 As recently
as 1992, he asked South Africans to "guard against the government-
sponsored attempts to extend the idea of a general amnesty for those
who opposed apartheid to cover the liability of those who main-
tained apartheid through killings, disappearances and torture.""2 8 He
called this attempt "an unconscionable effort to equate acts and mo-
tives which were protected by international law and morality with
the deeds of an immoral system."9 Asmal even predicted that the
settlement between the NP and the resistance groups could involve
granting amnesty to the military and police for murder and torture
and warned that this type of settlement "cripples the principle of
equality before the law which must underlie a future democracy...
perpetuates the culture of fear and intimidation that has prevailed in
our country since 1948,... [and] has debased the coinage of the
criminal law and encouraged state lawlessness. 30
Asmal's call for Nuremberg-type trials and his vehement
resistance to equating freedom fighters with perpetrators in an
amnesty process have essentially disappeared from his recent book.
While he continues to insist that the final report of the Commission
should not treat the two groups the same, he shies away from saying
that the Amnesty Committee should treat them differently. He
claims that "his experiences as an ANC constitutionalist during the
negotiated transition changed his mind, and he became a
protagonist of a South African Truth and Reconciliation
Conmmission."13' While this may be true, it is also possible that as a
current cabinet minister of President Mandela's government,32
Asmal is reluctant to criticize a delicate process in which his
government has invested much money, time, and hope. Although
Asmal's position may have changed, the problems that he
highlighted regarding granting amnesty to former apartheid police
and military personnel remain real. History has shown that the
indemnity granted by the apartheid regime to its members during
unrepentant perpetrators exploiting the Act's amnesty mechanisms while openly
flouting its goals of reconciliation." Id. at 17-18; see discussion infra Part VII.
127. Id. at 3.
128. Kader Asmal, Victims, Survivors and Citizens-Human Rights, Reparations and
Reconciliation, 8 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS., 491, 506 (1992).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 498.
131. ASMAL ET AL., supra note 4, at 3.
132. Asmal is the current minister of Water Affairs and Forestry. Steele, supra note
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the years of the armed struggle lead to additional crimes.'33 It
remains unclear whether the current amnesty process will foster
respect for the law and a commitment to democracy or whether it
will also "create a precedent for future crimes."'u Fortunately,
section 20(3), which further defines "an act associated with a
political objective" gives the Amnesty Committee leeway to
distinguish certain crimes.
IV. WHAT POLITICAL ACTS SHOULD QUALIFY FOR AMNESTY?
Section 20(3) of the Truth and Reconciliation Act lays out six
criteria that the Amnesty Committee must consider in deciding
whether an applicant's act was associated with a political objective.
Because the epilogue to the interim Constitution did not stipulate
any specific criteria, the drafters of the Act and Parliament had
considerable discretion in determining the requirements of amnesty.
The six criteria ultimately endorsed by Parliament essentially mirror
what are known as the six Norgaard factors. Professor Norgaard is
an independent jurist from Denmark who was called upon in June
1989 to interpret the terms of the Namibian Settlement Proposal,' s
which provided for the release of all Namibian political prisoners
and political detainees held by the South African authorities6
Specifically, Professor Norgaard was asked to define the term
"political offences" and to advise a United Nations Special Repre-
sentative whether sixteen prisoners held by South African
authorities were political prisoners entitled to release under the
terms of the proposal. After a thorough examination of both inter-
national and extradition law, he concluded that while certain
offenses, such as treason or "sedition directed solely against the state
and not involving the commission of common or ordinary crimes
such as murder or assault," are "classical" or "pure" political of-
fenses, the more "common" crimes, such as murder or assault, must
be committed under specific circumstances in order to constitute
political offenses.13 He devised a list of six factors that a court must
133. Asmal, supra note 128, at 498.
134. Id.
135. See C.A. Norgaard, Advice to the United Nations Special Representative on the
Entitlement of 16 Persons to Release as Political Prisoners Under Paragraph 7 of the
Nambian Settlement Proposal Uune 19, 1989) (on file with author).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2.
138. Id. at 4.
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take into account to determine whether an individual's otherwise
common crime qualifies as a "political offence."13
First, the court must look at "the motivation of the offender" to
determine whether the act was committed for political or personal
reasons.14 1 Second, the court must examine "the circumstances in
which the offence was committed; in particular whether it was
committed in the course of or as part of a political uprising or dis-
turbance. 14' Third, the court must consider "the nature of the
political objective;" that is, whether the political goal was to over-
throw the government or force a change in government policy.
14
Fourth, the court must evaluate the "legal and factual nature of the
offence, including its gravity. 143 Fifth, the court must take into
account the "object of the offense, e.g. whether it was committed
against government personnel or property or directed primarily
against private citizens."1 44 Finally, the court must assess the
"directness" and "proportionality" of the relationship between the
offense and the political objective sought.4
The Norgaard factors became the subject of much debate
during the 1990 negotiations between the apartheid government and
the ANC regarding the release of ANC political prisoners. The
working group established by the Groote Schuur Minute not only
recommended consideration of the six Norgaard factors, but also
added a seventh: "whether the act was committed in the execution
of an order or with the approval of the organization, institution or
body concerned.",146 Significantly, the working group elaborated on
the fourth Norgaard factor regarding the "legal and factual nature of
the offense," by stipulating that rape could never constitute a
"political offense.', 47 Unfortunately, this stipulation was left out of
the Guidelines for Defining Political Offenses in South Africa released by
the Department of Justice in November 1990 and the criteria
listed under section 20(3) of the Truth and Reconciliation Act.
The omission seems especially questionable given the gravity,
disproportionality, and possible "personal gain or personal malice"
139. For an explanation of how Norgaard devised the six factors see id. at 3-5 and
Keightley, supra note 56, at 340-46.
140. Norgaard, supra note 135, at 4.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 5.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ESTABLISHED UNDER PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE
GROOTE SCHUUR MINUTE, I 6.5.2(c)(iHvii) (1990) [hereinafter WORKING GROUP
REPORT].
147. Id. 6.5.2(c)(iv).
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associated with the crime of rape."' For instance, an ANC leader
who was vocal in the struggle against the community council
system in Worcester testified on June 24-25, 1996, at hearings before
the Committee on Gross Violations of Human Rights that she had
been sexually assaulted during her detention.1 4 If the political
motive of the state actor who assaulted her was to combat ANC
activists, the detention alone should have served that purpose and
the sexual assault was gratuitous and disproportional to the political
objective.
Although the working group report explicitly acknowledged
that "in certain circumstances a 'common crime,' even as serious a
one as murder, may be regarded as a political offence,"""0 no mention
of this is made in the November 1990 Guidelines. Without explicit
permission to regard murder as a political offense, the indemnity
committees which advised then President de Klerk on indemnity
applications might have assumed that violent crimes were too
"grave" and "disproportional" for consideration.151 In fact, the in-
demnity committee responsible for the Jacob Rapholo case did just
that when it rejected parts of Rapholo's application on the grounds
that "in no civilised society could or would the killing of a political
opponent be accepted or justified to further political ends."""
It is ironic, but hardly surprising, that members of the apartheid
government who were unwilling in 1990 to recognize violent crimes
as political offenses, presently insist that the murders committed by
the SAP and SADF were "acts associated with political objectives"
and are therefore worthy of amnesty.153 In 1990, the apartheid
148. An otherwise "political act" is ineligible for amnesty if committed "for personal
gain" or "out of personal malice, ill-will or spite, directed against the victim of the acts
committed." § 20(3) of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995.
149. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 12 (June 1996).
150. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 146, 16.5.2(c).
151. Keightley, supra note 56, at 338.
152. Rapholo v. State President, 1993 (1) SA 680, 686 (T). Rapholo headed an MK
ambush of security forces in December 1988, which resulted in one murder and four
attempted murders. Id. at 682-83. On Jan. 9, 1990, he participated in an attempted
armed robbery which resulted in two attempted murder charges. Id. On January 12,
1990, he was involved in the attempted murder of a policeman. Id. Rapholo submitted
an application under the 1990 Indemnity Act for these and other crimes. The indem-
nity committee and de Klerk denied Rapholo indemnity for the one count of murder
and the three counts of attempted murder in which "dangerous wounds were in-
flicted." Id. at 690. The court upheld the decisions to deny indemnity. Id. at 690-95.
153. De Klerk had rejected the possibility of granting amnesty for "cold-blooded
murder" during the NP's multiparty negotiations with the ANC, but ultimately agreed
to it when the ANC pressured the apartheid government to release an ANC activist
named Robert McBride, who was responsible for bombing Magoo's Bar, a bar fre-
quented by security policemen. De Klerk Distances NP from Atrocities, Reports from
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government was only willing to consider indemnity applications
involving violent crimes once the ANC had demonstrated
compliance with its promises under the Groote Schuur and Pretoria
Minutes to suspend the armed struggle 4 In 1994 and 1995, the
ANC-dominated Parliament was in a position to extract similar
political concessions from the NP in the language of the amnesty
provisions of the Truth and Reconciliation Act, but refrained from
doing so. Perhaps if the ANC had threatened to do this in 1993 and
early 1994, the IFP and the Third Force would not have collaborated
in the armed demonstration, held on March 28, 1994, to oppose the
April 1994 democratic elections, that claimed over fifty lives."
In the end, the ANC-dominated Parliament passed an amnesty
law that differed little from the Indemnity Acts of 1990 and 1992
passed by the apartheid government. Parliament incorporated all
seven of the criteria listed in the November 1990, Guidelines into
section 20(3) of the Truth and Reconciliation Act. Although the six
criteria closely resemble the Norgaard principles and the November
1990, Guidelines, there are a few distinctions. Section 20(3) of the
Act entirely omits from consideration the "nature of the political
objective," rejecting both the Norgaard formulation, which focused
on whether the political objective was to overthrow the government,
and the apartheid formulation, which broadened the "nature of the
political objective" to include acts taken to overthrow political oppo-
nents'T 6 The Amnesty Committee arguably may still consider the
"nature of the political objective" when looking at the first factor
which is "the motive of the person who committed the act, omission or
offence.'' 5 7 Presumably, the Amnesty Committee looks to see if the mo-
tive was political and not personal, and if so, what the political motive
SAPA, May 14, 1997, available at <http://www.truth~org.za/sapa9705/s970514c.htm>
[hereinafter De Kierk Distances].
154. See GN R2625 of 7 November 1990 § 4.2.
155. On March 28, 1994, the Inkatha Freedom Party held a demonstration in Johan-
nesburg South Africa, to protest the impending April 1994 elections. See M.S.
Prabhakara, ANC, Inkatha Differences in the Open, The Hindu, July 19, 1996, available in
LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. Fearful that the demonstration would lead to
violence against the ANC, members of the ANC asked the SAP to protect the ANC
headquarters known as Shell House. Id. The SAP failed to do so, and there is strong
reason to suspect that the apartheid government's Third Force collaborated in the IFP
protest of the elections. Id. When a large group of armed IFP demonstrators de-
scended on Shell House on the day of the protest, ANC security guards shot at the
crowd, killing eight demonstrators. Id. The ANC claimed that the guards fired in self-
defense and is currently involved in litigation pertaining to the incident. Id. The eight
IFP demonstrators shot in front of Shell House were among some 50 people who were
killed during the IFP demonstration of March 28, 1994. Id.
156. The apartheid government had altered the third Norgaard factor by replacing
the word "government" with "political opponent." Keightley, supra note 56, at 346.
157. § 20(3)(a) of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995.
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was; that is, whether it was to overthrow the apartheid government
or destroy a rival political party.
The Amnesty Committee can interpret the six criteria listed
under section 20(3) in two ways. Section 20(3) reads "[w]hether a
particular act, omission or offence.., is an act associated with a
political objective, shall be decided with reference to the following
criteria" -' and then lists the six criteria described above. Section
20(3) also stipulates that an act associated with a political objective
"does not include any act" committed "for personal gain" or "out of
personal malice, ill-will or spite, directed against the victim of the
acts committed."'1 The language and structure of section 20(3)
suggest that the Committee should look at each of these factors first
separately, and then together, to determine whether an act was
associated with a political objective. The drafters could have
included the six factors and the two grounds for exclusion to help
the Committee determine whether an act was actually "political" or
"personal." Assuming this was the drafters' intent, it is not clear
why the Committee must consider the "gravity" of the act under the
third factor and the proportionality of the act under the sixth factor
to decide if the act was "political."
While the gravity and proportionality factors may shed light on
the "political" nature of an act, they will not always assist the Com-
mittee with its overall analysis. Whether an act constitutes a
particularly grave crime or is disproportional to the political goal
does not necessarily render the act any less "political." Conceivably,
section 20(3) gives the Committee the discretion to deny amnesty for
certain acts, even if they served a political goal, on the grounds that
the "political" act in question was too horrific or disproportional to
the goal pursued to qualify for amnesty. This less generous inter-
pretation of section 20(3) gives the Committee the discretion to
refuse amnesty for the worst human rights abuses, thereby allowing
the Committee to show respect for international human rights law
and to restore a sense of justice to the victims of apartheid's worst
crimes. Diane Orentlicher believes amnesty laws can be used to fos-
ter reconciliation "provided they do not cover atrocious crimes
which international law requires states to punish."16' She offers the
amnesty law in Colombia as a model example because it excluded
murders of noncombatants and other "brutal" crimes.61 If the grav-
ity and proportionality factors had been listed separately from the
other factors as explicit grounds for denying amnesty, South Africa's
158. Id. § 20(3).
159. Id.
160. Orentlicher, supra note 89, at 2550.
161. Id. at 2550 n.46.
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Amnesty Committee would have had to interpret the amnesty
criteria more stringently and would have to deny amnesty for
particularly egregious international crimes.
This Note strongly supports a narrow interpretation of the
section 20(3) criteria that would allow the Committee to deny
amnesty for "political" crimes that are too grave or disproportional
to permit the applicant to escape all criminal and civil liability.
Justice Mohamed, in his opinion in the AZAPO case, emphasized
the importance of the proportionality factor in the amnesty analysis
and noted that this factor distinguished South Africa's amnesty
process from other automatic amnesties. A stricter interpretation
of the criteria may lead to fewer revelations about South Africa's
past, but is more likely to foster "reconciliation" and respect for the
law and democracy. The amnesty decisions rendered thus far,
however, show that the Amnesty Committee is adopting a liberal,
rather than a narrow, reading of the six criteria under section 20(3).
The Committee has decided to look at the six factors collectively to
determine if an act was truly "political" and as a result has granted
amnesty for extremely grave and disproportional "political"
crimes. This decision may compromise the goal of reconciliation as
many South Africans, particularly Black South Africans, feel they are
being asked to pay an exorbitant price for "the truth."'"
A. The Motive for Committing the Act
The first factor the Amnesty Committee must consider under
section 20(3) is "the motive of the person who committed the act,
omission or offense."'6' The drafters did not include specific
examples of what they considered to be political motives, possibly
because they wanted the Committee to be able to consider political
motives not directly related to continuing or ending the apartheid
government. However, if Parliament intended the amnesty
provisions to cover such motives, it could have retained the
language in the November 1990 Guidelines which explicitly
recognized political objectives designed to "force a change in the
162. Azanian Peoples Org. (AZAPO) v. President of Republic of South Africa, 1996
(4) SALR 671, 691 (CC) (emphasizing that the "amnesty contemplated is not a blanket
amnesty... granted automatically" but rather requires "regard to the careful criteria
listed in section 20(3) of the Act, including the very important relationship which the
act perpetrated bears in proportion to the object pursued").
163. See discussion of Diale decision, infra notes 278-287, and discussion of Mitchell
decision, infra notes 291-302, and accompanying text.
164. See Hugh Dellios, Pardons for Apartheid Crimes Angering Many Blacks, THE
RECORD, Dec. 22, 1996, at A27.
165. § 20(3) of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995.
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policy of or to overthrow or destroy the political opponent" as
legitimate.'"
Parliament did not resurrect the third Norgaard factor because
this language would have restricted the list of legitimate "political
objectives or motives" to those directly involving the "government"
(e.g., the motives of the ANC, SACP, PAC, and UDF to overthrow
the NP government and/or change its apartheid policies). This
interpretation of political motive is more closely related to the
practices of states in extradition law than the virtually limitless
range of political motives and objectives permitted under the
amnesty provisions of the Truth and Reconciliation Act. For
instance, the extradition practices of Great Britain, France, and
Switzerland restrict the definition of political offenses to acts
committed against the government.167 The Apartheid and Genocide
Conventions impute criminal responsibility "irrespective of motive
involved, to individuals, members of organizations and institutions
and representatives of the state, whether residing in the territory of
the state in which the acts are perpetrated or in some other state."1'"
On the other hand, Chile, El Salvador, Uruguay, and Argentina did
not distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate political motives
in their amnesty processes.69 Thus, South Africa's refusal to make
such distinctions does have some support among international state
practices.
Although the first amnesty factor is vague, at a minimum it
requires that the motive have a political component. For example,
the Amnesty Committee found that amnesty applicants, Johan van
Eyk and Hendrik Gerber, lacked a political motive for torturing and
murdering Samuel Kganakga on May 21, 1991. 71 Van Eyk and
Gerber were ex-policemen working at a private security service
called Fidelity Guards along with the deceased.' They suspected
the deceased was involved in the theft of sixty thousand rand from
the cellar of the building where Fidelity Guards was located and the
theft of several million rand from Fidelity Guards.1' The applicants
abducted the deceased, hung him upside down from a tree, and
166. GN R2625 of 7 November 1990 § 3.2(iii).
167. Keightley, supra note 56, at 340-44.
168. See Apartheid Convention, supra note 89, at art. 3; Genocide Convention, supra
note 89 (emphasis added); ASMAL ET AL., supra note 4, at 202.
169. For a discussion of Chile, El Salvador, Uruguay, and Argentina see supra text
accompanying notes 94-96.
170. Amnesty Committee Decision Granting Amnesty to Johan van Eyk and Hendrik Ger-
ber, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, available at <http://www.truth.org.za/
amnesty/24.htm>.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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interrogated him about the missing money for several hours by
applying shocks to his body, including his sexual organs.' 73 They
claimed they had to kill him when he tried to escape because had he
escaped with such serious injuries, they would have been "in big
trouble." 174 One of the applicants explained that the police had
covered for him in the past when he had interrogated someone who
had only minor injuries.'75 To avoid trouble with the police and to
prevent identification of the deceased, the applicants burned the
body. 76
The Committee concluded that the applicants had not acted on
the basis of a political motive, on behalf of a political organization,
or against a political opponent.177 Furthermore, the gravity of the act
and its disproportional relationshig to the goal pursued made the act
"totally unsuitable" for amnesty. In an attempt to persuade the
Committee that the murder served a political purpose, the appli-
cants claimed that the deceased stole the money for a political
party.'7 They also claimed they were acting in the interest of the
government, the country, and their employer when they committed
the interrogation and the murder.'8 The Committee dismissed these
claims, noting that nothing in the court judgment on the merits, or in
"the long and detailed judgment on sentence" suggested that the
applicants had acted for political reasons or knew of any political
connections of the deceased, or even suspected the deceased had
political connections."" The judgment indicated only that the appli-
cants suspected the deceased had helped to commit the robberies at
Fidelity Guards."2 The Committee concluded that the applicants tar-
geted the deceased because they suspected him of theft, not because
of his political activities, and that the applicant's motive for killing
"was to ensure that the deceased would not lay a charge against
them and not to fulfill any political objective."'
This decision suggests that the Committee will not treat all
personal motives as political ones for purposes of the amnesty
analysis. Yet by leaving the first factor deliberately vague,
Parliament left the Committee free to regard all political motives as
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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legitimate regardless of whether the underlying politics were racist.
Brigadier Cronje, one of five White amnesty applicants from the
former security police seeking amnesty for the murders of over forty
Black individuals, claimed that the struggle between the apartheid
government and the resistance movement was "never based on a
race foundation."'" He said that the SAP had taken actions against
White terrorists in which they were treated "in precisely the same
manner" as Black terrorists, but he could not "remember" any
specific examples.'5 When General van der Merwe, an apartheid-era
police commissioner, testified at the hearings of the five security
policemen, he explained that the SAP's motive for killing ANC
"terrorists" was to protect Black members of the SAP from
impending terrorist attacks.'TM During cross-examination General
van der Merwe added, "We knew if we couldn't protect our black
members and maintain their morale, the whole system would
collapse."'187 As part of their defense, the five applicants claimed that
they were fighting an anti-Communist war, and alleged that the
security forces indoctrinated their members on a daily basis,
convincing many of them that theX should fight freedom fighters
because of their communist beliefs.
Although applicants are often reluctant to admit race-based po-
litical motives, at least one of the drafters of the amnesty provisions,
George Bizos, believes the Amnesty Committee would accept such
motives.19 While international law categorically condemns and pro-
hibits all forms of race discrimination by the state, 9 the Truth and
Reconciliation Act offers full criminal and civil indemnity to state
officials who committed violent race-based acts, simply because
their motives were at some level political. By the same token, the
184. Cronje, supra note 10, at 12.
185. Id.
186. Testimony of General J.V. van der Merwe Before the Amnesty Committee (Oct.
22, 1996) (unpublished transcript, on file with author) [hereinafter Testimony of van
der Merwel.
187. Id.
188. See Cronje, supra note 10, at 15 (giving the following quote from President
Mandela's autobiography as an example of propaganda in the government: "[bjy
definition if a man worked for the present service, he was probably brain washed by
the Government's propaganda. He would have believed that we were terrorists and
communists who wanted to drive the white man into the sea." NELSON MANDELA,
LONG WALK TO FREEDOM 405 (1996)).
189. Interview with George Bizos, supra note 2. Mr. Bizos believes that applicants
are refraining from admitting such motives simply because it is not "politique" or po-
lite to say such things in public. Id.
190. See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
U.N. Doc A/810 (1948); American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9
I.L.M. 673; European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221;
Apartheid Convention, supra note 89.
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Amnesty Committee may find that an admittedly race-based politi-
cal motive arose instead out of "personal malice, ill-will or spite"
and thereby reject the amnesty application.19' Given the natural re-
luctance of applicants to admit to racist motives, the Committee is
unlikely to have enough evidence to reject applications solely on the
grounds that the motives were racist and therefore personal. Even if
the Committee decides race-based motives satisfy the first criterion
under subsection 20(3)(a), the Committee must still weigh the other
five factors to determine whether the applicant deserves amnesty.
B. The Context in Which the Act Was Committed
The second factor the Amnesty Committee must consider is the
"context in which the act, omission or offence took place, and in
particular whether the act.., was committed in the course of or as
part of a political uprising, disturbance or event, or in reaction
thereto.'92 Once again, the ANC-dominated Parliament decided to
retain the apartheid government's language, in this case, the
addition of the words "in reaction thereto," in establishing the
amnesty factors. This decision seems to constitute a political
concession to those most likely to take retaliatory action against anti-
apartheid groups for having created political disturbances, such as
the NP, the Conservative Party, the AWB, and the Freedom Front.
Apartheid supporters who have applied for amnesty, especially
members of the SAP, have claimed they committed their acts in the
context of a "total onslaught" by the ANC, SACP, PAC, and UDF
against the NP government and insist that it was "necessary to take
precaution against the action of the activists and to act outside
normal police channels and the normal legal system."'9 3
According to the five former security policemen who applied
for amnesty in October 1996, South Africa suffered from "a full-scale
guerrilla war" led by the ANC and SACP against the state govern-
ment. 9' After the UDF was established in 1983, this "war"
191. Section 20(3)(a)(i) of the Act prohibits the Committee from granting amnesty to
persons who acted "for personal gain" or "out of personal malice, ill-will or spite, di-
rected against the victim of the acts committed," and racist motives arguably fall
within the parameters of these exclusions. § 20(3)(a)(i) of Promotion of National Unity
and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995.
192. Id. § 20(3)(b).
193. Cronje, supra note 10, at 2 (emphasis added). Cronje's testimony was confirmed
by Captain Hechter and Officer van Vuuren. See Testimony of Security Police, supra
note 48.
194. The five applicants were Brigadier J. Cronje, Colonel R. Venter, Captain J.
Hechter, Warrant Officer P. van Vuuren, and Captain W. Mentz. The first four men
testified before the Amnesty Committee during the period of Oct. 22-Nov. 1, 1996, in
City Hall, Johannesburg. See Testimony of Security Police, supra note 48. In June 1997,
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intensified and remained at a "full-scale" level until about 1989, de-
spite emergency measures taken by the government, such as the
1986 Public Safety Amendment Act.9 During his testimony before
the Amnesty Committee, Brigadier Cronje described the political
context between 1983 and 1989 as a "full-scale, almost conventional
war in South Africa" and explained that the police had to model
their techniques on the military and perform operations "of a mili-
tary nature., 196 Brigadier Cronje summarily concluded on behalf of
himself and the other four applicants that the war-like atmosphere
made it "necessary to eliminate infiltrated terrorists and activists.'
197
While anti-apartheid organizations also perceived the country
to be in a state of armed struggle, their response was not as ruthless
as that of the apartheid government. The ANC often described its
struggle as a "People's War,"1 98 but never authorized war on the
people supporting the apartheid government.'9 Although the ANC
did commit murders, even some they have acknowledged as exces-• 201
sive, they selected their targets more carefully than the SAP and
SADF and killed far fewer people.20' In a submission to the Justice
Department, former Commissioner of Police, General van der
Merwe "attributed 153 deaths to alleged ANC 'acts of terror.' ,,202
Brigadier Cronje and Captain Hechter applied for an additional nine killings which
they had "forgotten about." Vlakplaas Cops Seek Amnesty for Nine More Murders, Reports
from SAPA, June 3, 1997, available at <http://www.truth.org.za/sapa9706/s970603b.htm>.
The amnesty hearings for these nine murders have not yet been held.
195. See ASMAL ET AL., supra note 4, at 88.
196. Cronje, supra note 10, at 3.
197. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
198. STATEMENT TO THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (African Na-
tional Congress, Marshalltown, South Africa), Aug. 1996, at 9 [hereinafter ANC
STATEMENT].
199. "It was the policy of the ANC--ever since the formation of MK in 1961-to
avoid unnecessary loss of life. The ANC has never permitted random attacks on civil-
ian targets." Id. at 9.
200. The ANC "acknowledge[s] that, in the context of this [liberation] work, excesses
did occur." Id. at 11.
201. The ANC policy statement of January 1987 said that Umkhonto Sizwe, the ANC
military wing ("MK"), "must continue to distinguish itself from apartheid death forces
by the bravery of its combatants, its dedication to the cause of liberation and peace,
and its refusal to act against civilians, both black and white." Id. at 9. One study of 150
MK operations between 1976 and 1982 found they "overwhelmingly concentrated on
economic targets, the administrative machinery of apartheid, the police and SADF in-
stallations and personnel." Id.
202. ASMAL ET AL., supra note 4, at 41. In his written submission to the Amnesty
Committee on Oct. 21, 1996, General van der Merwe noted that the number of police
members killed between 1973 and 1992, but did not say how many of these murders
were caused by the ANC. There were 76 police members killed between 1973-79, 270
killed between 1980-90, and 385 killed between 1991-92. General J.V. van der Merwe,
Written Statement Submitted to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 17 (Oct. 21,
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This number, even if true, pales in significance compared to the
thousands of people killed by the apartheid regime.su With respect
to attacks on civilian targets committed by the MK, the ANC stated:
"the ANC does not seek to justify such attacks, but insists that the
context in which they occurred is relevant. ',2°4 Clearly, the "context"
throughout 1960 until May 10, 1994, was one of oppression for the
ANC and other banned organizations who were forced to work un-
derground, often from abroad, and with limited financial resources.
While the apartheid government could and did pass emergency
laws to detain and convict members of anti-apartheid political or-
ganizations,2 5 the organizations themselves had no means to arrest
or prosecute members of the SADF and SAP even though many
were guilty of violent apartheid crimes.
Thus, when the Amnesty Committee considers the "context" of
a given act, it must keep in mind the political reality of apartheid:
the oppressive laws, and the completely unequal resources of the
opposing sides in South Africa's "war." The Committee must not
forget that much of the alleged "Black on Black violence" cited by
the apartheid regime as grounds for its repressive measures was in
fact fostered by the apartheid government's financing of the IFP.
216
The Amnesty Committee should not allow the leaders of the SAP,
SADF, and IFP to justify their actions on the basis of a "war" they
largely created and perpetuated. The Committee must acknowledge
that the circumstances in South Africa between 1960 and 1994 war-
rant a substantially different analysis of the amnesty applications of
freedom fighters than those of apartheid officials who largely cre-
ated and controlled these circumstances.
C. The Legal and Factual Nature and the Gravity of the Act
The third factor the Amnesty Committee must consider is the
legal and factual nature and the gravity of the act.2 07 This section
requires the Committee to determine how South African law
classifies the acts for which amnesty is sought. Examination of the
legal nature of the act allows the Committee to determine the
1996) [hereinafter Written Statement of van der Merwel (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
203. ASMAL ET AL., supra note 4, at 41.
204. ANC STATEMENT, supra note 198, at 10 (emphasis added). "The ANC has ac-
knowledged that in a number of instances breaches in policy did occur, and deeply
regrets civilian casualties. The leadership took steps to halt operations in conflict with
policy." Id.
205. See ASMAL ET AL., supra note 4, at 82-89.
206. See Inkatha Leaders Blamed for 1994 Massacre, Agence France Presse, July 7, 1996,
available in LEXIS, World Library, AFP File.
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specific crime or delict for which amnesty is being granted. For
example, an applicant may have described the bombing of a political
opponent's house as an illegal use of explosives and malicious
damage to property on his amnesty application. If the Committee
grants amnesty only for these two criminal offenses, the applicant
could be tried for attempted murder because he may have intended
to kill the occupants of the house.
The importance of properly identifying the legal nature of an
act became clear during the October 1996 hearings of the five
security policemen. The Committee actually allowed two of the
applicants, Colonel Venter and Captain Hechter, to add criminal
offenses to their applications during their public testimony. Colonel
Venter asked to have 'murder' added to his application once he
realized that his testimony about "the Pebco Three incident" could
make him an accomplice to the murder of three prominent ANC
activists.08 Captain Hechter asked the Committee to change his
application from "attempted murder" to "murder" after he was
implicated by Brigadier Cronje in the detonation of a bomb that
killed a government official.2° Such last minute changes show
flagrant disrespect of the amnesty application's requirement of full
disclosure.
While identifying the legal and factual nature of an applicant's
act is useful to courts, prosecutors, and potential plaintiffs who need
to know whether an act can form the basis of a future law suit, it is
puzzling how this determination helps the Committee to decide
whether an act is associated with a political objective. Whether a
person's conduct constitutes first or second degree murder sheds
little light on whether the person acted with a political objective.
Furthermore, the focus on the gravity of the alleged political act
suggests either a moral or safety concern about granting amnesty to
persons who have committed horrific crimes even when those
crimes have served a political objective. If this is the concern ex-
pressed, the drafters of the amnesty provisions should have required
the Committee to assess the gravity of an act after determining
whether the act was associated with a political objective rather than
207. § 20(3)(c) of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995.
208. Testimony of Security Police, supra note 48, at 21. The "Pebco Three incident"
refers to the disappearance and murder of three prominent ANC activists named Si-
pho Hashe, Qaqawuli Godolozi, and Champion Galela. The three men disappeared
from the Verwoerd Airport in Port Elizabeth in 1985. "Pebco" stands for the Port
Elizabeth Black Civil Organization. Colonel Venter explained that he was called down
from Vlakplaas to Port Elizabeth to pick up three ANC "terrorists" at the airport and
hand them over to the Port Elizabeth police somewhere near the ocean. Id. at 21-24.
He insisted that he was only involved in the abduction, and not the subsequent inter-
rogation and murder of the men. Id. at 26-27.
209. Testimony of Security Police, supra note 48, at 82.
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during the determination process. At the very least, the provisions
should explain how the gravity of an act informs the Committee's
assessment of whether the act was political. The implicit meaning of
the provision is that the more grave the act, the less political it is, but
unlike the other factors in section 20(3), the gravity of an act is not
necessarily correlated to or even illustrative of its political nature.
The inclusion of the gravity factor appears to grow out of the
structure of the other amnesty provisions. These provisions oblige
the Committee to grant amnesty for acts found to be associated with
a political objective, provided the acts fall within the prescribed time
period and have been fully disclosed by the applicant. If the drafters
had wanted to limit the range of political acts eligible for amnesty,
they could have incorporated limitations into the definition of "an
act associated with a political objective" or made gravity an explicit
ground for denying amnesty for an otherwise political act. Likely,
the drafters included the gravity assessment because of the signifi-
cant legal consequences of a determination that an act was
associated with a political objective (e.g., full criminal and civil in-
demnity). They shied away, however, from making the gravity of an
act a ground for denying amnesty for an otherwise political act as
they did with respect to political acts motivated by "personal
gain,... personal malice, ill-will or spite" under subsections 20(3)(i),
(ii).
The Committee must recognize applicants' acts for what they
are under both South African and international law. Further, the
Truth Commission's final report should explicitly identify all acts
that constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes of
genocide and apartheid as such, whether committed by government
officials or freedom fighters. Although the Truth Commission can
make such legal and factual determinations in its final report and
thereby respect international law, the Amnesty Committee will have
trouble reconciling its duty to grant amnesty to those persons who
meet the criteria of the Act and its duties under international human
rights law. For example, the apartheid government's torture and
murder of ANC "prisoners of war" may qualify as political acts, but
they also constitute war crimes that require prosecution under
international law.210 Under international law, those who committed
210. According to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol I of 1977, certain
acts, like torture, become a war crime when committed against prisoners of war
during an international or non-international armed struggle. See generally Geneva
Conventions of 1949, supra note 87, Protocol 1, supra note 88. "A war crime is a grave
breach of the terms of the Geneva Conventions which results in death, great suffering,
or serious injury to any protected party, prisoner or civilian." Ziyad Motala, The
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, the Constitution and International Law,
28 COMP. INT'L. L.J. S. AFR. 348 (citation omitted). Protocol I defines "grave breach" to
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the war crime of torture cannot claim in mitigation that they were
acting under superior orders."' Under the South African amnesty
criteria, those who commit torture under orders are not only eligible
for amnesty, but are more likely to receive it because they acted under
orders. South Africa's Amnesty Committee not only has explicit
statutory authority to grant amnesty to applicants who have
committed the war crime of torture, but has already done So.212
Although the Committee lacks the statutory authorization to
deny amnesty categorically for certain legal acts such as war crimes
or crimes against humanity, the Committee can and must take the
gravity of an alleged political act into account. The more the act in
question violates international human rights law, the more the
Committee should weigh its gravity against its political nature. To
make an informed legal determination of the nature and gravity of
an act, the Committee must elicit and scrutinize all relevant facts.
The Committee must assess whether the harm grew out of the delib-
erate or negligent conduct of the actor, whether the amnesty
applicant could have or should have foreseen the consequences of
his or her actions, and whether the object or target of the act was an
innocent civilian or a political opponent. This analysis naturally im-
plicates several of the other amnesty factors.
D. The Object or Objective of the Act
The fourth factor the Amnesty Committee must consider is the
object or target of the act.213 If an act is truly political, it should at the
very least be directed against a political opponent or his or her
property. Since the adoption of the armed struggle and the
formation of the MK in 1961, ANC policy has always been "to avoid
include "willful killing, torture or any inhuman treatment, making the civilian
population the target of attack, destruction of property... practices of apartheid and
other degrading practices based on racial discrimination." Protocol I, supra note 88, at
art. 85. While the ANC officially endorsed both the Geneva Conventions and Protocol
I, the apartheid regime ratified only the Geneva Conventions and claimed it was not
bound by Protocol I. See Motala, supra, at 347. Though the apartheid government did
not ratify Protocol I, the government arguably had an obligation to observe its terms
as it simply codified already well-known and accepted principles of contemporary
international law. See ASMAL ET AL., supra note 4, at 197; Motala, supra, at 349. Despite
its international legal duty to treat ANC prisoners of war and civilians humanely, the
apartheid government consistently violated this duty. See Convention Against Torture,
supra note 89; GA Res. 2506(A), supra note 93, at art. 4; GA Res. 2396, supra note 93, at
art. 8(c); ASMAL ET AL., supra note 4, at 197-98.
211. ASMAL ET AL., supra note 4, at 198.
212. See Amnesty Committee Decision granting amnesty to Boy Diale and Christopher
Makgale, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, available at <http://www.trutltorg.za/
amnesty/25.htm> [hereinafter Diale and Makgale Decision].
213. § 20(3)(d) of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995.
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unnecessary loss of life., 214 In the early 1960s, the MK permitted
attacks on government installations provided they did not involve
the loss of human life.215 Members of the MK were trained not to
define the enemy along racial lines and were told to shoot only in
self-defense. 6 Over time, however, ANC policy designated certain
members of the SAP and SADF as legitimate hard targets and
permitted operations against them."1 Although the apartheid
government insisted on calling ANC members "terrorists," the ANC
never authorized or condoned terrorism.218 The ANC authorized the
use of landmines on White border farms, but did not consider White
farmers in these areas civilians because they were integrated into the
state's security system and supplied with automatic weapons.
21 9
As a general rule, the Committee should always regard the
murder of an innocent civilian as a grave political act, no matter
what the applicant's political motive. Most states exclude the delib-
erate killing of innocent civilians from their definition of "political
offenses" when deciding whether to extradite an individual. Since
the beginning of the armed struggle in 1961, the ANC has always
maintained that it is "not only morally wrong but strategically
senseless to attack civilian targets.2 21 Under the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions and Protocol I of 1977, the murder of innocent civilians
during an armed conflict rises to the level of an indefensible grave
222breach and requires prosecution.
During his testimony before the Amnesty Committee on Octo-
ber 21, 1996, General van der Merwe accused the ANC of adopting
an armed struggle strategy that violated Protocol I, a document the
214. ANC STATEMENT, supra note 198, at 56.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. The ANC defines terrorism "as military attacks on civilians by armed groups or
individuals." Id.
219. Id. at 59-60.
220. See Keightley, supra note 56, at 343-44. In France:
offences involving violence against civilians have been regarded as so
serious as to override the significance of any political motive espoused
by the group responsible for them. Accordingly, such offences have been
held not to be political.... Common to the approaches of the continental
courts is the same reluctance shown by the English and Irish courts to
extend the benefits of the political offence exception to violent offences
committed against ordinary citizens.
Id.
221. ANC STATEMENT, supra note 198, at 57.
222. Geneva Convention I, supra note 87, at art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note
87, at art. 50; Geneva Convention III, supra note 87, at art. 129; Geneva Convention IV,
supra note 87, at art. 146; Protocol I, supra note 88, at art. 85.
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ANC purports to embrace. At the ANC Consultative Conference
held in Kabwe, Zambia in June 1985, the ANC decided that it "must
attack not only inanimate objects, but also enemy personnel" and
that "the distinction between 'hard' and 'soft' targets should disap-
pear., 223 Van der Merwe said this decision "was... a flagrant
violation of that very undertaking which the ANC ostensibly held so
dear, namely the signing at the end of 1980 of Protocol I of 1977 of
the Geneva Convention of 1949 wherein it was declared that its fu-
ture actions, inter alia, would only be directed at military targets. 224
In its official statement to the Truth Commission, the ANC openly
admitted that at the Kabwe Conference in 1985, the ANC adopted a
resolution "acknowledg[ing] that there would be unavoidable civil-
ian casualties as warfare escalated" while simultaneously
reaffirming its former policy regarding legitimate targets.
225
The ANC concedes that it sanctioned a few operations against
legitimate hard targets, such as military bases, that resulted in civil-
ian deaths. On May 20, 1983, the ANC permitted a car bomb attack
on South African Air Force (SAAF) headquarters on Church Street in
Pretoria which killed nineteen people, of whom at least eleven were
SAAF officers, and injured 200, of whom at least seventy were
members or employees of the armed forces."' Although the ANC re-
grets the civilian deaths and injuries caused by this attack, the ANC
has stressed that it never ordered or permitted the deliberate massa-
cre of civilians as the apartheid government did. For example, on
June 16, 1976, the SAP opened fire on 10,000 pupils in Soweto's Or-
lando West High School, killing 140 and injuring 1000 more.227 While
there is no question that the loss of civilian life caused by ANC op-
erations constitutes a gross violation of human rights, there
remains a difference between the deliberate killing of hundreds
of unarmed students and the indirect or negligent killing of ci-
vilians during attacks on military targets. The Amnesty Committee
223. Written statement of van der Merwe, supra note 202, at 5-6, (quoting an edito-
rial printed in Sechaba, the official publication of the ANC, which described the
conference).
224. Id. at 7 (referring specifically to articles 1, 52(1) and 57 of Protocol I).
225. ANC STATEMENT, supra note 198, at 6. At Kabwe, the ANC decided that "the
risk of civilians being caught in the crossfire when such operations took place could no
longer be allowed to prevent the urgently needed all around intensification of the
armed struggle." Id. at 9.
226. Id. at 58.
227. South African Youth Urged to Devote Energies, Xinhua English Newswire, June
16, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL 10548815. The students were peacefully protesting
the apartheid governments insistence that Black students be taught in Afrikaans.
David Shribman, A Brutal Repression is Now Consigned to History's Scrapheap, BOSTON
GLOBE, May 3, 1994, at 1. In the four months of rioting that ensued after the June 16th
massacre, approximately 600 students were killed. Id.
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must remain mindful of such differences when analyzing the
"target" of the act.
Often, the Committee will have trouble determining whether an
applicant has killed an innocent civilian or a genuine political
opponent. For instance, when the victim of a crime or a living
relative of a deceased victim contests the applicant's allegation that
the victim was a "terrorist," a "communist," or a "double agent," the
Committee must decide whose testimony is more credible. Even
when the Committee finds that the applicant genuinely believed the
victim to be a political opponent, it must determine whether the
applicant had a reasonable basis for this belief. The more an
applicant sought verification and corroboration of the victim's
political activities, the more likely the motive for committing the act
against the victim was "political."
The difficulty of determining whether a victim was a legitimate
political target was apparent at the amnesty hearings of the five se-
curity officers held in Johannesburg in October 1996.228 During
Warrant Officer van Vuuren's testimony about the torture and mur-
der of three alleged ANC activists in 1987, he alleged that one of the
activists, Jackson Maake, was a double-agent.2" According to van
Vuuren, the SAP had given Maake a car and expected him to drive
weapons over the border from Botswana in order to deliver them to
ANC activists after the SAP had booby-trapped the weapons.30 Van
Vuuren claimed that Maake never made such deliveries and started
acting suspiciously by showing up at SAP headquarters even
though he had been told to keep away.231 Because Maake's actions
made the SAP suspect he was a double agent also working for the
ANC, van Vuuren, Captain Hechter, and an "askari," 2 named Joe
Mamasela, took Maake to a remote farm to interrogate him. Under
electric shock torture, Maake confessed to being a double agent and
said that Andrew Makupe was his ANC contact.
23
Van Vuuren went on to explain how he and other security po-
lice verified Maake's admissions by looking up the police file on
Makupe.23 Van Vuuren claimed the file revealed that Makupe was
228. See Testimony of Security Police, supra note 48.
229. Id. at 48.
230. Id. at 55.
231. Id. at 56.
232. An "askari" is a former ANC activist who has been captured by the police and
"persuaded" to change sides. Askaris and other police informants got paid for the in-
formation they supplied. Id.
233. Id. at 44-45. Assuming Maake did. "confess" to being a double agent as van
Vuuren alleged, it is hard to know how credible his confession was given that electric
shock torture was applied to induce this confession.
234. Id. at 45.
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an arms courier for the ANC.2s The police picked up Makupe, tor-
tured him and learned that Harold Sefola was the head of an ANC
'cell' containing Makupe, Maake, and a few others. 236 The result-
ing interrogation of Sefola provided enough evidence to persuade
van Vuuren and Hechter that Sefola, Maake and Makupe did belong
to an ANC cell.237 The officers decided it was necessary to kill all
three of them in order to destroy the cell. 238
Van Vuuren claimed that the purpose of the officers' actions
was to eliminate ANC terrorists and to prevent the deaths of
innocent people .' He asserted that it was not possible to detain the
three men legally because the manner in which the police extracted
information would get them into trouble with the magistrate.20
Furthermore, if the three activists were allowed to live, any
information provided during the interrogations would quickly
become useless.241 Van Vuuren believed that his actions were
necessary in order to protect innocent people from being killed. 2
Maake's mother vehemently denied that her son was a "double
agent. 2 43 She insisted that he never drove a car and could not have
gone to Botswana for three months because he had never left the
house for more than a few days.4 Although the wives of Makupe
and Sefola admitted that their husbands were involved in ANC ac-
tivities,245 Mrs. Maake steadfastly protested her son's innocence and
implicitly accused the police of targeting the wrong person or of fab-
ricating an excuse for killing him. Faced with equally convincing but
conflicting testimony, the Committee must decide whether van
Vuuren killed a double agent, a police informant, or merely an
eighteen-year-old boy who knew some ANC activists and admitted
235. Id.
236. Id. A cell is a small group of ANC activists, usually 4 to 10 people, who per-
form counter-apartheid operations together. For reasons of secrecy, members of a cell
are told nothing that does not relate to the operation of their own cell. They know
nothing of the operation of other cells. Id. at 51.
237. Id. at 46.
238. Id. at 55.
239. Id. at 46-47.
240. Id. at 53; see also Injury Under Questioning Was Death Sentence: Security Police-
man, Reports from SAPA, Oct. 30,1996, available at <http://www.tutorg.za/sapa9610/
s961030khtm>.
241. See Testimony of Security Police, supra note 48, at 53.
242. Id. at 54; see also Mother of Slain Activist Dismisses Policeman's Testimony, Re-
ports from SAPA, Oct. 29, 1996, available at <http://www.truth.org.za/sapa9610/
s961029j.htm>.
243. Testimony of Security Police, supra note 48, at 53, at 60-62.
244. Id. at 60.
245. Id. at 62, 65.
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under torture to being a double agent in order to stop the admini-
stration of electric shocks.
The problem is an evidentiary one. For many of the acts in
question, actual physical evidence is hard to come by. The
Committee's decision must, therefore, come down to a credibility
determination between the applicant and the opposing witness, a
difficult process subject to abuse. As many anti-apartheid activists
hid their political affiliations, it is relatively easy for members of the
apartheid police and military to allege their victims were political
threats. The Amnesty Committee must keep factors such as this in
mind in making its determination.
E. Whether the Act was Committed Under
Orders or with Organizational Approval
The fifth factor the Amnesty Committee must consider is
whether the act was committed under orders or with the approval of
246a political organization. In many respects, the fifth factor in the
amnesty analysis resembles what is known as "the defense of
superior orders" in criminal law. This defense is often raised during
criminal trials of military subordinates who claim they had a legal
duty to obey the orders of their superiors. National legal systems
have developed various doctrines for dealing with the conflict
between a soldier's duty to obey and his need to take responsibility
for his actions. The doctrine of respondeat superior categorically
relieves from all liability a soldier who commits a crime under
orders.4 The doctrine of absolute liability, on the other hand,
requires the subordinate to evaluate all superior orders and refuse to
perform those that constitute illegal acts. 48 The amnesty provisions
of the Truth and Reconciliation Act adopt a middle of the road
approach; while the defense of superior orders may be raised in
support of an amnesty application, it is not a complete defense.
South Africa's amnesty provisions actually go well beyond the usual
scope of the defense of superior orders by recognizing the mere
"approval" of a political organization or movement as a mitigating
factor in the amnesty analysis.
The Nuremberg Tribunals did not even allow accused
individuals to plead the defense of superior orders to what were
identified as "war crimes;" they could only raise this defense in
246. § 20(3)(e) of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995.
247. Paul Eden, Criminal Liability and the Defense of Superior Orders, 108 S. AFR. L.J.
640, 641 (1991).
248. Id. at 642.
[VOL. 3:183
Truth and Reconciliation
mitigation of sentence.4 9 It is still open to debate whether the
Nuremberg Principles are a source of customary international law
binding on all states because they have never been formally
codified.2 Clearly, South Africa did not consider itself bound to
respect them. Other sources of international law, most notably the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 1977 Protocols, impose a duty
on contracting state parties to prosecute, extradite, and punish
persons who have committed or ordered "grave breaches."25' This duty
to prosecute applies both to superiors and their subordinates, yet the
Conventions and Protocols fail to say whether the defense of
superior orders qualifies as a legitimate excuse for "grave breaches."
The drafters of Protocol I tried to include a provision relating to the
defense of superior orders but did not succeed.2, 2 As neither the
Conventions nor the Protocols forbid the use of the defense as the
Nuremberg Principles do, contracting state parties could arguably
raise or recognize the defense. South Africa, a party to the
Conventions, but not the Protocols, made a significant choice by
incorporating the defense of superior orders into the fifth criteria of
the amnesty analysis by offering indemnity from prosecution to
persons who committed "grave breaches."
Under South Africa's broad amnesty criteria, both he who gives
orders and he who follows them can escape prosecution provided
the acts ordered or committed were "associated with a political
objective" and provided all relevant facts are fully disclosed to the
Amnesty Committee. South Africa's amnesty provisions do not
presume the defense of superior orders or duress for lower or
middle-ranking officers.m The applicant always bears the burden of
249. See Eden, supra note 247, at 642 n.14 (quoting article 8 of the Charter of the In-
ternational Military Tribunal: "[t]he fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of
his Government or a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be con-
sidered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so
requires").
250. See Maurice Albert, The Question of Superior Orders and the Responsibility of
Commanding Officers, 263 INT'L REV. OF RED CROSS 105-07 (1988).
251. See Geneva Convention I, supra note 87, at art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra
note 87, at art. 50; Geneva Convention III, supra note 87, at art. 129; Geneva Conven-
tion IV, supra note 87, at art. 146; Protocol I, supra note 88, at art. 85.
252. Eden, supra note 247, at 652-53.
253. In Argentina, the 1983 decree which ordered the prosecution of members of the
first three military juntas limited the prosecution to persons with "decision-making
capacity" who had ordered subordinates to commit crimes and to subordinate officers
who had "exceeded" their illegal orders. In effect, the 1983 decree gave most lower
and middle ranking officers who acted under orders, amnesty from prosecution;
however, these individuals could still be prosecuted if they had followed orders
involving "an atrocity or aberrant act." See MARIA LUISA BARTOLOMEI, GROSS
VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA, 1976-1983: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
PROCEDURE UNDER ECOSOC RESOLUTION 1503 281, 286 (1983). Despite the new
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proving he or she acted under orders or with organizational
approval. Any party opposing the application can rebut this
evidence.
The first step for the Committee in applying this factor is to dis-
tinguish between specific and general instructions to act. As the
testimony of the five former security policemen and General van der
Merwe revealed at the amnesty hearings in October 1996, the SAP
did not specifically authorize every operation taken against
"terrorists" and "communists."25 When specific instructions were
given, the source often varied; some came from immediate superiors
and others came straight from the State Security Council.25 General
van der Merwe testified that instructions regarding the 1988 bomb-
ing of Khotso-House, an "internal headquarters" of the ANC, came
from President P.W. Botha and Minister of Law and Order, Adriaan
Vlok.2m His testimony shocked the nation because it publicly impli-
cated high level officials and discredited the apartheid regime's
efforts to blame human rights violations on rogue state officials.
Brigadier Cronje also implicated high-ranking officials in his
testimony. He claimed that until the mid 1980s, the SAP had
authority only to act in a "reactionary way."257 He explained that,
over the course of time, the SAP had to take a more "proactive" and
"preventative" approach to defending the state and combating its
opponents.2 s In early 1986, Cronje received "general instructions"
from Brigadier Viktor, second in command of the Intelligence Unit,
to take "every necessary step" to bring the situation in Pretoria
under control.2 If a person attacked a policeman's home, the police
were directed to take steps to destroy that person's house.2 ' Later in
1986, Brigadier Schoon instructed the SAP to work with the "spes-
forces" of the SADF, essentially a military hit squad.2 61 Brigadier
democratic government's efforts to use the defense of superior order to protect many
officers from prosecution, many of the judges trying the officers in the civilian appeals
courts "threw out the concept of 'due obedience.' " Id. at 295. The government
responded by passing the law of due disobedience, which created an irrebuttable
presumption that low and middle ranking officers, and even most officers of higher
rank, had acted under superior's orders or duress. This 1987 law indemnified many
officers from prosecution and President Menem's pardons in 1989 and 1990 ensured
that no officer, regardless of whether he gave orders or followed them, would be
prosecuted. Id. at 283.
254. Testimony of van der Merwe, supra note 186, at 6.
255. Id. at 6-7. The State Security Council included the President, the Ministers of
Police and Defense, and representatives from National Intelligence.
256. Written Statement of van der Merwe, supra note 202, at 27.
257. Testimony of van der Merwe, supra note 186.
258. Id.
259. Cronje, supra note 10, at 6.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 8.
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Cronje interpreted both of these general instructions to mean that
the SAP had to take a "full-scale" war approach and use "proactive
guerrilla tactics" against activists to prevent acts of terror.'
6
To Brigadier Cronje's knowledge, this approach was followed
at every security branch in South Africa and no one in the
government, from immediate supervisors to the Government
Security Council and the Cabinet, ever repudiated it.2 Brigadier
Cronje was convinced that the SAP pursued the proactive
approach against anti-apartheid organizations "because of the
Government's approval. '2" De Klerk explicitly denied this
accusation in his submission to the Truth Commission, stating that
"the unconventional strategies from the side of the Government...
within my knowledge and experience.., never included the
authorisation of assassination, murder, torture, rape, assault or the
like.'2' He went so far as to say that he has "never been part of any
decision taken by Cabinet, the State Security Council or any
Committee authorizing or instructing the commission of gross
violations of human rights.",26 High-ranking officials of the former
apartheid regime have repeatedly denied that they ever ordered or
permitted their subordinates to murder, torture, and pillage.
The fact that many of the SAP's instructions were of such a
general nature makes it difficult for the Committee to ascertain
when individual security officers were acting under orders and
when they exceeded the scope of their "express or implied
authority. 26 7 Brigadier Cronje and the other applicants from the
security forces clearly believed they were acting "on behalf" of the
State.2 Cronje's claim that the State had knowledge of and failed to
repudiate these actions also suggests State approval. The Amnesty
Committee must again determine who is more credible: the
262. Id.
263. Id. at 7.
264. Id.
265. F.W. de Klerk, Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission by Mr.
F.W. de Klerk, Leader of the National Party 8 (Aug. 1996) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).
266. Id.
267. § 20(2)(b), (f) of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995.
268. Dirk Coetzee, who testified before the Amnesty Committee in November 1996,
also claimed he was acting under orders. He said, "[w]e were executing orders (which
were) anything but legal. We were involved in illegal cross-border raids, blowing up
(bodies), stealing cars, abducting and killing people." Claire Keeton, I Killed in Line of
Duty, Says Coetzee: TRC Has to Decide Whether Following Orders is Sufficient for Am-
nesty," SOWETAN, Nov. 7, 1996, at 11. Once a police officer became involved in the
security forces, Coetzee said it was dangerous to challenge or disobey orders from su-
periors. Id. He referred to the police murder of Vlakplaas's own agent, Brian
Ngqulunga, to show how dangerous questioning and resisting orders was. Id.
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subordinates who claim they acted under the instructions of the
State or the high-ranking officials who continue to deny the State's
involvement. Because the fifth factor is only one of many considered
by the Amnesty Committee, applicants need not prove they acted
under orders; however, applicants who received general or vague
instructions will likely be able to prove that they acted "on behalf of"
or "with the approval" of the State. In this respect, the fifth criteria is
overly generous because it does not allow the Committee to
distinguish between acts that are selfinitiated or self-serving and
those that are government ordered or approved.
Because of the nature of the resistance movement, it is more dif-
ficult for members of the ANC and other anti-apartheid
organizations to satisfy the fifth criteria of the amnesty analysis than
for SAP and SADF members. It is easier for members of the SAP or
SADF to find witnesses to corroborate claims that they were acting
under orders. To insulate themselves from the State, anti-apartheid
groups gave instructions to members only in small groups. Out of
necessity, MK training stressed the "need for personal initiative" at
all levels of the MK hierarchy and tried to "develop the capacity of
operatives to use their own discretion based on strict political con-
siderations," such as holding the moral high ground and not
perceiving the struggle as a race war. For the most part, senior MK
commanders provided only general guidelines to subordinates un-
270less the subordinates were participating in a major operation.
The apartheid State was in a much better position than the ANC
or MK leadership to know what its subordinates were doing and to
give them more specific instructions. Given the meticulous reporting
procedures that were in place,"1 the State either knew or should
have known the exact activities of its personnel and could have eas-
ily repudiated actions exceeding the boundaries of permissible
military and police conduct. The ANC and MK leadership, acting
either in exile or underground, had less knowledge about their com-
rades' activities and could not give more specific instructions as
easily or as often.
The anti-apartheid movement needed to operate in secrecy,
leaving lines of communication unreliable and difficult to maintain.
As a result, orders were less detailed and the grant of authority to
subordinates was less explicit. In addition, it was often difficult
to pinpoint the source of a particular instruction. Therefore, an
269. ANC STATEMENT, supra note 198, at 58.
270. Id.
271. See Former Vlakplaas Operatives Reveal Secret Unit, Reports from SAPA, Oct. 25,
1996, available at <http://www.truth.org.za/sapa9610/s961025c.htm>; P. W. Botha
Knew About Secret Unity, Truth Body Told, Reports from SAPA, Oct. 30, 1996, available
at <http://www.truth.org.za/sapa9610/s961030f.htm>.
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anti-apartheid member seeking amnesty may find it more difficult
than a SADF or SAP member to prove that he was acting under
orders. In analyzing the fifth factor with respect to such applicants,
the Committee must keep in mind the circumstances under which
the anti-apartheid movement was operating and the difficulty the
movement had in supervising the activities of its subordinates.
F. The Relationship Between the Act and the Political Objective
The sixth and final factor that the Amnesty Committee must
take into consideration is the relationship between the act and the
political objective. 2 Deciding whether the Committee should assess
the directness or proportionality of the relationship between the act
and the political objective sought became a controversial issue that
ultimately required resolution at the Cabinet level. 273 The propor-
tionality requirement was retained despite tremendous pressure
from the NP to omit it.274 Upset at the inclusion, the NP insisted that
the Committee should also consult the criteria used by the apartheid
government under the Indemnity Acts of 1990 and 1992. Section
20(4) of the Act therefore requires the Committee to take the older
criteria into consideration.
This concession was somewhat of a victory for the NP. De Klerk
argued that the existing criteria should be interpreted generously. In
his submission to the Truth Commission, de Klerk asked the Com-
mission
[to] ensure that.., it adheres strictly to the requirements
of... the precedent already established by the extension of
indemnity to large numbers of people in terms of the Fur-
ther Indemnity Act. In this regard, it should be borne in
mind that the great majority of such indemnities were
granted to supporters of revolutionary movements, that
many of them had committed and had been convicted of
heinous and disproportional crimes and that their release
was part of the price demanded by the ANC in September
1992 for returning to the negotiating table.2m
Section 20(4) implies that the Amnesty Committee should
interpret the directness and proportionality requirement leniently,
even in cases of disproportional crimes. Ironically, de Klerk himself
272. § 20(3)(0 of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995.
273. See HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, supra note 63, at 6.
274. Id.
275. De Klerk, supra note 265, at 9 (emphasis added).
FALL 1997]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
denied indemnity on the grounds that murder was too
disproportional an act to any political objective pursued. 76 During
the NP's negotiations with the ANC in the early 1990s, de Klerk at
first rejected, but ultimately agreed to the possibility of granting
amnesty for "cold-blooded murder" after the ANC pressured the
apartheid government to release from prison an ANC activist
responsible for bombing a bar frequented by security policemen.2
In light of the inconsistencies among de Klerk's former indemnity
decisions, it is unclear how the Amnesty Committee should treat
cases involving murder.
For instance, in one decision, the Committee found that the
murder of a man by two members of a tribe struggling for inde-
pendence was sufficiently related or proportional to the political
goal of regaining control of a Civic Center that used to belong to the
tribe. m Boy Diale and Christopher Makgale were members of the
Action Committee of Bafokeng tribe resisting incorporation in the
homeland of Bophuthatswana and seeking to reinstate their tribal
chief.279 The tribe's chief had been driven into exile and replaced by
Glad Mokgatle, an appointee of the Bophuthatswana President, Mr.
Lucas Mangope.280 The trouble began after Mokgatle was appointed
chairman of the Tribal Council in the Bafokeng District and given
the keys to the Civic Center, an important and symbolic structure for
the tribe.281 The applicants decided that the only way to regain con-
trol of the Civic Center was to seize the keys from Mokgatle, who
was killed during the resulting abduction and interrogation. Diale
and Makgale claimed that they did not originally intend to kill Mok-
gatle, but realized that they would go to jail if he was allowed to
live.2
The Amnesty Committee concluded that the applicants
"believed they were acting on behalf of the Bafokeng people in fur-
therance of their political struggle against an oppressive regime."2m
Assuming this belief was reasonable, the Committee had to decide
whether abducting, assaulting, and finally killing Mokgatle to get
the keys to the Civic Center was directly related to this political goal.
The question is not whether it was "necessary" to kill him, but
276. See supra note 152.
277. Robert McBride was responsible for bombing Magoo's Bar and for killing many
of its patrons. De Kierk Distances, supra note 153.
278. Diale and Makgale Decision, supra note 212.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
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whether killing him was "proportional" to the goal of regaining
control of the Civic Center, and whether regaining control of the
Civic Center was "proportional" to the ultimate goal of regaining
control of the tribe. The inquiry is further complicated by the fact
that the applicants admitted that the main reason for killing the vic-
tim was so that he could not identify them.2 s
Refusing to concede the obvious, the Amnesty Committee
merely said that "it might appear from the evidence that the
applicants" killed the victim because they feared he would implicate
them in the assault if he had lived.2M Ultimately, the Committee
ignored the evidence and the disproportional relationship between
the murder and the political motive, concluding that "the evidence
as a whole leaves no doubt that the attack on the deceased was
associated with a political objective, that is regaining control of the
Tribe., 217 While the Committee's conclusion makes sense under a
liberal interpretation of the six criteria, it would not follow from a
more narrow interpretation of section 20 (3 ).2" Even if the facts
support a finding of a political motive, they do not necessarily
demonstrate a direct or proportional relationship between the
motive and the act committed. Under a narrow interpretation of
section 20(3), the Committee could have denied amnesty even
though the murder of Mokgatle served a political objective, because
killing him was far too grave and disproportional a means of
achieving that objective. The Committee's decision to grant amnesty
likely reflects the fact that Mokgatle's sons did not oppose the
applications.8 9
Yet, in a decision granting amnesty to Brian Mitchell, a White for-
mer police officer serving a thirty-year jail sentence for his role in the
Trust Feed Massacre of December 3, 1988,29 the Committee did not even
refer to the proportionality principle.2' Mitchell was a former secretary
to the Joint Management Committee in Pietermartizburg.m The apart-
heid government established the Joint Management Committee System
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. See discussion on possible interpretations of § 20(3), supra text accompanying
note 158-164.
289 See Diale and Makgale Decision, supra note 212.
290. South Africa; Amnesty for First Apartheid Police Killer, Africa News, Dec. 18,
1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, AFRNWS File.
291. Amnesty Committee Decision Granting Amnesty to Brian Victor Mitchell, Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, available at <http://www.truth.org.za/amnesty/07.htn>
[hereinafter Mitchell Decision].
292. Id.
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to develop and implement counter-revolutionary strategy.2 The pur-
pose of the strategy, in part, was to train special constables to oppose
and undermine the activities of the UDF, which the police perceived
to be the internal arm of the banned ANC.2 Mitchell ordered a
group of special constables to attack a house outside of Pietermar-
tizburg, in an area called Trust Feeds, because he believed
UDF/ANC activists were hiding out there.9" He instructed the con-
stables to "target male persons between the ages of 16 and 35 who
were involved in the political violence in the area.
29 6
When Mitchell's squad attacked the house, it discovered eleven
women and children inside mourning at an all-night vigil.' Al-
though the squad had clearly targeted the wrong house, it killed all
of the occupants anyway.2 Despite the SAP's "frantic and feverish
attempts to cover up this colossal blunder," Mitchell and four of the
special constables were sentenced to death on eleven counts of mur-
der and to three years of imprisonment on each of two counts of
attempted murder on April 30, 1992.2 On April 24, 1994, the State
President commuted Mitchell's death sentence to thirty yearsimprisonment.3°°
The Committee emphasized that Mitchell was under the
command of the Joint Management Committee System and felt
obliged to carry out the system's strategyY9 1 They also found
significant the fact that Mitchell "had no personal motive" in the
attack and that several of the special constables convicted with
Mitchell had already been released from prison under the provisions
of the Further Indemnity Act of 1992. The Committee did not
discuss at all whether the actual act of killing eleven women and
children was "proportional" to the goal of combating the UDF
and ANC. The decision to grant amnesty under such extreme
circumstances, suggests that the Committee is either interpreting the
proportionality principle leniently or ignoring it altogether.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Amnesty for First Apartheid Police Killer, supra note 290.
298. Id. The eleven women and children who were murdered were: Mseleni Ntuli,
Dudu Shangase, Zetha Shangase, Nkoyeni Shangase, Muzi Shangase, Filda Ntuli,
Fikile Zondi, Maritz Xaba, Sara Nyoka, Alfred Zita, and Sisedewu Sithole. The two
victims of attempted murder were Ida Hadebe and Nomagoli Zuli.
299. Id.
300. Mitchell Decision, supra note 291.
301. Id.
302. Id.
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If the Amnesty Committee feels bound to follow its own prece-
dent, the Mitchell decision precludes the Committee from following
a more narrow interpretation of section 20(3). The eleven murders
constituted a grave act against innocent civilians in a peaceful set-
ting that was grossly disproportional, if not completely unrelated, to
the original political objective. Had the Committee looked at the
gravity of the act, the nature of the victims, and proportionality of
the crime as separate inquiries, rather than focusing on the original
political intent of the order and the attack, it is clear that Mitchell
would have been denied amnesty. As a practical matter, the public
stood to gain little from a grant of amnesty to Mitchell because the
"truth" about the Trust Feed Massacre had already been revealed
during the criminal trials of Mitchell and the squad members.
Although the Committee essentially ignored the proportionality
factor in the Mitchell decision, it did invoke this factor to deny am-
nesty for the murder of innocent civilians in another case. 3 On
August 14, 1997, the Committee denied amnesty to the convicted
murderer of two farm workers in the Western Cape in the 1980s, but
granted amnesty to his two accomplices.3 The three applicants, P.
Maxam, T. Madoda, and C.S. Ndinisa, were political activists in the
Paarl Youth Congress, an affiliation of the UDF.2 They claimed that
they were following the orders of then president of the ANC, Oliver
Tambo, to steal guns from White households, when they broke into
a farmhouse to steal firearms on April 15, 1986.306 During the course
of the burglary, Maxam shot and killed Anne Foster and John Gey-
ser, two farm workers who happened to be on the property,
primarily to prevent himself from being identified.7
The Committee granted amnesty to all three men for the crime
of housebreaking, finding Tambo's orders to be compulsory and the
procuring of firearms from White households to be a "legitimate po-
litical objective."108 The two accomplices, Madoda and Ndinisa were
granted amnesty for attempted murder, but Maxam's amnesty re-
quest for the two murders was denied. The Committee found no
evidence that the applicants regarded the murders "as a political
objective within their express or implied authority.'"39 The Commit-
tee found that there was "no need to kill these people in furtherance
303. See Amnesty Granted for Two, not Third, in Farm Killings, Reports from SAPA,
July 18, 1997, available at <http://www.truth.org.za/sapa9707/s970718c.htm>
[hereinafter Farm Killings].
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
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of any instructions from the ANC or elsewhere. 31 The Committee
concluded that "the killing of these two innocent people was so dis-
proportionate to the aims sought to be achieved, that is to obtain arms
with which to defend themselves, that it is not an act associated with
a political objective for which amnesty should be granted."3"
An examination of the above decisions shows that the Amnesty
Committee is not applying the proportionality principle consistently.
In both the Diale and the Maxam cases, the applicants admitted the
killings were committed to prevent future identifications by the
victims. In the Diale case, the Committee seemingly ignored theh ,,31
admission in favor of the "evidence as a whole. Maxam's
admission, on the other hand, was enough to render his purpose
apolitical.3 3 Given that the main objectives in both cases involved
arguably equivalent legitimate political goals and that the murders
in both cases occurred in the pursuit of these goals, the Committee
had no clear reason to treat them differently. Furthermore, the
murders of the eleven women and children in the Trust Feed
Massacre were also likely committed to prevent the identification of
the special constables because the murders clearly did not serve
Mitchell's goal of combating male participants in UDF's violent
political activity.
The Amnesty Committee also treated the murders of "innocent
people" inconsistently in the Mitchell and Maxam decisions. As the
Committee explained in the Maxam case: "[t]here was no need to
kill these people in the furtherance of instructions" from Oliver
Tambo and the ANC;3 4 similarly, there was no need for to kill the
women and children discovered in Trust Feed in order to comply
with Mitchell's instructions. Mitchell ordered the special constables
to kill only sixteen- to thirty-five-year-old men who had committed
political violence in the area. Tambo's instructions to seize firearms
from White households likewise did not include murdering
"innocent" people on the premises. If the Committee found "the
killing of [these] two innocent people was so disproportionate to"
Maxam's political goal of obtaining arms,3 s then the Committee
certainly should have found the killing of eleven innocent women
and children grossly disproportionate to Mitchell's goal of combat-
ing violent male UDF activists. Under a narrow interpretation of the
six amnesty criteria, none of the murders in the Diale, Mitchell, and
310. Id.
311. Id. (emphasis added).
312. See supra text accompanying notes 278-287.
313. See Farm Killings, supra note 303.
314. Id.
315. Id.
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Maxam cases would qualify for amnesty because the murders were
too disproportionate to the political objectives pursued.
V. How CAN THE AMNESTY PROCESS ELICIT THE FULL TRUTH?
Section 20(1)(c) requires an applicant to make a "full disclosure
of all relevant facts" in order to obtain amnesty.31 6 In keeping with
many of the other sections of the act, the drafters declined to define
the meaning of "full disclosure." The process has therefore turned
up some interesting problems related to the substance of certain
types of disclosure, such as the effect of self-incriminating state-
ments and statements that incriminate third parties. The Amnesty
Committee should interpret the full disclosure requirement nar-
rowly to ensure that only persons who apply in good faith receive
amnesty. The Committee should deny amnesty when it discovers
that an applicant has not told the entire "truth." If the Committee is
willing to offer applicants full criminal and civil indemnity, the
applicants should be willing to provide "full disclosure of the
relevant facts" even if such disclosure incriminates them or others.
In the course of their testimony, amnesty applicants inevitably
make self-incriminating statements. Section 31(1) of the Act obliges
"[any person who is questioned by the Commission... or who has
been subpoenaed to give evidence.., at a hearing of the Commis-
sion shall... answer any question... notwithstanding the fact that
the.., answer may incriminate. 3 17 As a check on that requirement,
section 31(2) requires the Committee to consult with the Attorney
General who has jurisdiction and to demonstrate that the requested
information is "reasonable, necessary and justifiable in an open and
democratic society based on freedom and equality."3 18 Finally, sec-
tion 31(3) forbids the use of "any incriminating answer or
information obtained or incriminating evidence directly or indirectly
derived from questioning" against a person referred to in section
31(1) "in criminal proceedings in a court of law or before any body
or institution established by or under any law.' 3 9
At the amnesty hearing for the five security policemen, the
applicants expressed concern about the scope of section 31(3)'s
protection for self-incriminating statements. The applicants wanted
to know whether section 31(3) applies only to persons directly
questioned or subpoenaed by the Commission under section 31(1),
or whether it also applies to persons under section 29(1)(c) who are
316. § 20(1)(c) of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995.
317. Id. § 31(1).
318. Id. § 31(2).
319. Id. § 31(3).
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"by notice in writing call[ed] upon to appear before the Commission
and to give evidence or to answer questions."' 0 The applicants
asked the Committee to state on record that all of the applicants'
testimony would be covered by section 31(1) and thus protected
from future use under section 31(3). 32' Surprisingly, the Committee
refused to do this, explaining that whether the applicants' testimony
constituted an "answer" under section 31(1) is for a future tribunal,
not the Committee, to decide.32 The Committee claimed that it did
not have the power to give a ruling now that would bind the powers
of a future tribunal, especially because a tribunal in a future hearing
would have to decide whether testimony elicited by victims'
questions qualifies for the same protection given to testimony
elicited by Commission questions under section 31(3).323
Although alarmed by the Committee's refusal, the five
applicants made self-incriminating statements on their own and
under questioning by the Commission and others. The applicants
likely assumed that a tribunal would not use their amnesty
testimony against them as doing so would defeat the purpose and
spirit of the amnesty process. Sections 31(1) and 31(3) certainly could
be interpreted as providing full protection for self-incriminating
testimony from applicants regardless of whether it is elicited by the
Committee or a victim. The objective of the amnesty process
suggests that applicants should be protected from having both their
voluntary and compulsory testimony used against them. Without
this protection, very few if any persons would come forward. The
Committee's refusal to reassure the five security policemen leaves
future applicants in an uncertain position.324
Tribunals must also grapple with the issue of what constitutes
incriminating evidence "indirectly derived from a questioning" by
the Committee. For instance, Officer van Vuuren said he would be
willing to identify the site in which Maake, Makupe, and Sefola
were killed and the bodies destroyed provided this evidence could
not be used against him in the future.3 5 In contrast to its earlier
reluctance, the Committee immediately reassured van Vuuren,
320. Id. § 29(1)(c).
321. Testimony of Security Police, supra note 48, at 1.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. The Durban High Court recently held in the highly publicized criminal trial of
Dirk Coetzee that certain confessions to the Amnesty Committee could not be admit-
ted in a later criminal trial for murder. This decision may do much to re-assure
potential applicants. Coetzee's Confession to Harms Commission Ruled Admissible, Re-
ports from SAPA, April 30, 1997, available at <http://www.truth.org.za/sapa9704/
s970430f.htm>.
325. Testimony of Security Police, supra note 48, at 97.
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explaining that the Committee required these types of facts for the
purpose of full disclosure and that therefore they were protected under
section 31(3)36 This response seems to contradict the Committee's
earlier claim that a tribunal might find applicants' responses to victims'
questions admissible. Although the Committee's ruling and the terms of
section 31(3) would prohibit a tribunal from using the fact that van
Vuuren pointed out the site as evidence he committed the crime, it is not
dear whether the tribunal could admit evidence obtained later at the
site that independently linked van Vuuren to the crime. Arguably,
such evidence would be "indirectly derived from a questioning,"
but the questioning would have come from the victims, not from the
Committee. George Bizos believes section 31(3) would allow a
tribunal to admit what he called "derivative evidence" of this kind.27
If the Committee denies amnesty after holding a public hearing
in which self-incriminating evidence is exposed, it will be difficult
for potential plaintiffs and prosecutors to resist using this evidence
to gather additional evidence against the applicant. However,
evidence gathered in this manner may be inadmissible as "indirectly
derived from a questioning." Prosecutors also face the problem of
applicants incriminating themselves with evidence already pos-
sessed by the prosecution. Presumably, the evidence would still be
admissible, but tribunals may find it difficult to determine whether
evidence was gathered before or after an amnesty hearing. George
Bizos notes that the Act was never intended to allow amnesty appli-
cants to make already known evidence inadmissible against them by
simply raising it in their written applications or during Committee
hearings.3 8
In the course of full disclosure of the relevant facts of an
incident, it is not uncommon for applicants to incriminate
individuals other than themselves. During his testimony about the
Pebco Three incident, Colonel Venter was asked about others who
may have been involved in the abduction and interrogation of the
three ANC activists.329 The attorneys representing the relatives of the
Pebco Three victims asked him to supply not only the names of
those who planned the operation, but also the names of any officers
who would have been aware of what had happened.3 Venter stated
that he did not know who was responsible for the decision to abduct
and eliminate them, but he did provide the names of four policemen
326. Id. at 98.
327. Interview with George Bizos, supra note 2.
328. See id.
329. Testimony of Security Police, supra note 48, at 25.
330. Id.
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who had knowledge of the events.33 The Committee decided to use
its section 29 powers to subpoena the four officers. 2
When Colonel Deon Niewoudt, one of the four named by
Venter, appeared before the Committee on Monday, October 28,
1996, his counsel explained that the subpoena had only arrived on
Thursday and that principles of fairness and equity required the
Committee to give Niewoudt time to review the evidence before
requiring him to testify.3 As the attorney for the applicants pointed
out, the Truth and Reconciliation Act does not indicate the
minimum amount of time necessary for reasonable notice to a
person implicated in Truth Commission hearings.m The Act merely
requires the Committee to afford any person implicated in a
proceeding an opportunity to give evidence or make submissions on
his or her behalf. The Committee, conceded that in some cases a
fortnight might constitute reasonable notice, but decided to
postpone the testimony of the four men indefinitely. . The
applicants' attorney argued that the Act does not entitle implicated
persons to a review of the incriminating testimony or of the amnesty
337applications. Stressing that the implicated persons were not on
trial, the attorney argued that the amount of notice usually required
prior to a trial did not apply to amnesty proceedings. The
Committee, choosing to ignore these objections, agreed to give them
more time to review the applications and the testimony.39
By giving the four men time to prepare their testimony and
compare each others versions of the events, the Committee seri-
ously jeopardized the goal of full disclosure. The Committee
made this mistake again with respect to two incidents in which
members of the SADF and Civil Cooperation Bureau ("CCB")34
were implicated by one or more of the five applicants. During his
testimony about the murder of the Ribeiros, Brigadier Cronje im-
plicated Special Forces Commander, Major General Joep Joubert,
331. Id.
332. Id. at 25, 35; see also Truth Body to Subpoena Motherwell Bomber, Reports from
SAPA, Oct. 23, 1996, available at <http://www.trut.org.za/sapa9610/s961023h.htm>.
333. Motherwell Bomber Asks Truth Body for Postponement of Testimony, Reports from
SAPA, Oct. 25, 1996, available at <http://www.truth.org.za/sapa9610/s961025f.htm>.
334. Testimony of Security Police, supra note 48, at 36.
335. § 30(2) of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995.
336. Testimony of Security Police, supra note 48, at 36; see also Disappearance of
PEBCO Three: Amnesty Hearings Postponed, Reports from SAPA, Oct. 28, 1996, available
at <http://www.truth.org.za/sapa9610/s961028d.htn>.
337. Testimony of Security Police, supra note 48, at 36.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. The CCB was another arm of the apartheid's regime counter-revolutionary
system and strategy.
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SADF Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Ian Gleeson, Noel Robey of
the CCB, and CCB Commander Colonel Joe Verster in the cover-up
of the murders. 41 Concerned about proper notice, the Committee cut
Cronje's testimony short and postponed further testimony on the
Ribeiro murders until the implicated men could be notified. 2
How much notice the Committee must give to persons impli-
cated in other people's testimony has been a source of some
contentious litigation against the Commission. Two members of the
apartheid regime implicated in human rights violations, Brigadier
du Preez and Colonel van Rensburg, sought an interdict against the
Truth Commission requiring the Committee to give them reasonable
notice before forcing them to appear at an amnesty hearing. 3 Judge
King granted an interdict, forbidding the Commission from allow-
ing testimony implicating the two men until they had received
"proper, reasonable and timely notice" of the time and place of the
proposed hearing.344 In June 1996, a full bench of the Cape Supreme
Court overturned Judge King's decision, holding that the Truth
Commission had no obligation to give advance notice to persons
whom the Commission had reason to believe would be implicated
as an alleged perpetrator of gross human rights violations.)4 The
Court also held that once a witness implicates another person as
such a perpetrator, the Commission must give this person an op-
portunity to submit representations to the Commission or give
evidence at a hearing within a stipulated reasonable time.346 Finally,
the Court held that implicated persons have a right to any informa-
tion involving their alleged involvement in the human rights abuse,
such as copies of witness statements and transcripts of evidence.
34 7
These holdings constituted a significant victory for the Commission
because requiring them to issue notice before testimony began
would seriously impede and delay the Commission's work.
In order to obtain "full disclosure of all relevant facts," the
Committee has the power to subpoena people and documents under
section 29 of the Act. When Colonel Venter implicated four other
policemen in the Pebco Three incident, the Amnesty Committee
341. Laufer, supra note 83, at 1.
342. Counsel for the victims who opposed amnesty for the Ribeiro murders asked
the Committee to subpoena then president P.W. Botha to determine what he knew
about the murders and the SADF cover-up. He was finally subpoenaed in September
1997. Pat Reber, Truth Panel Subpoenas Ex-President, OREGONIAN, Oct. 1, 1997, at A4.
343. Truth and Reconciliation Commission v. Du Preez, 1996 (3) SALR 997, 1001
(CC).
344. Id. at 1002.
345. Id. at 1009-10.
346. Id. at 1010.
347. Id.
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subpoenaed them to get a more complete picture of what happened,
especially because Colonel Venter's testimony was questionable."'
Venter claimed he did not know the Pebco Three would be killed
and that he did not know what happened to them. 9 If one of the
other four policemen subpoenaed testifies that Venter did possess
such knowledge, then Venter's application should fail for lack of full
disclosure. Venter could even face a fine or jail time for having lied
to or misled the Committee.3° The testimony of people present at the
scene with the applicants can either corroborate or refute the claims
of the applicants or fill in gaps in the applicant's memory. Given the
value of such information, the Committee should use its subpoena
powers liberally in the interest of full disclosure.
Generally, the Commission tries to rely on voluntary public
submissions from perpetrators, but occasionally finds it necessary to
subpoena people to testify in camera. For instance, the Truth Com-
mission asked the Ministers of Safety and Security and Defense to
make submissions, but ultimately had to subpoena the testimony of
certain officers when they refused to revise their unsatisfactory and
unhelpful submissions.51 The Commission has allowed several peo-
ple to testify in camera, having determined that certain information,
even if obtained only through a closed hearing, is vital to the pursuit
of truth and reconciliation. 2 Although some have criticized the
closed hearings for thwarting the goal of full disclosure, the Com-
mittee fortunately retains the right to disclose information released
in closed hearings in its final report.3 53 Ironically, in some cases,
permitting a person to testify in a closed hearing is the only way for
the Commission to obtain full disclosure of all the relevant facts.
VI.SHOULD REMORSE BE A CRITERION FOR AMNESTY APPLICANTS?
Notably absent from the amnesty criteria is a contrition
requirement. Some interpret the terms of the Act as obliging the
348. Testimony of Security Police, supra note 48, at 25, 35.
349. Id. at 26-27.
350. § 39(d)(ii) of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995.
351. Among the policemen subpoenaed were Johan van der Merwe, who testi-
fied in public on October 21, 1996; Johan Coetzee, who testified in camera in
Cape Town on November 18, 1996; and former law and order minister Adriaan
Vlok. Vlok is the first cabinet minister of the old apartheid regime to be com-
pelled to testify before the Truth Commission. Daisy Jones, Truth Probe to Grill
Vlok and Generals, STAR, Oct. 4, 1996, at 1.
352. Dr. Alex Boraine, New Developments Within the Commission, TRUTH TALK, THE
OFFICIAL NEWSLETTER OF THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, Cape Town, South Africa), Nov. 1996, at 2, 4.
353. See id.
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Committee to give amnest even to applicants who have not
apologized for their acts. - Others dismiss this interpretation
because it means a person could be brought before the Commission
against his will, disclose his acts without contrition, and walk away
with the benefit of amnesty.i The former approach "discards the
core ideas of voluntary confession, the renunciation of bad ways,
and of reconciliation within humane norms."3 The Amnesty
Committee can and should require of applicants both an apology for
and a renunciation of past crimes as a precondition to amnesty. 7 A
public apology and a renunciation of past crimes will strengthen
democracy and foster a human rights culture in South Africa.ns
Nothing in the Act explicitly precludes the Truth Commission
from requiring an apology from amnesty applicants. One possibility
would be for the Committee to insist the applicant apologize as a
form of "reparation. "3 An observer of the October 1996 hearings of
the five security policemen noted that the applicants failed to "make
way for the remorse their victims desperately need to see them feel-
ing if truth is to beat a path through anger to reconciliation."6 The
observer concluded that the applicants seemed incapable of feeling
remorse, of "opening the heart and the soul to the pain of others and
one's own pain at having caused it."3' While the attorney for the
five applicants often claimed that the applicants were sorry for what
they had done, at no time in their testimony did the applicants
themselves express remorse or ask for forgiveness. Not surprisingly,
many victims found the absence of genuine remorse from the appli-
cants to be further grounds for opposing their applications.
During his submission to the Truth Commission in August of
1996, de Klerk apologized to the nation for the "pain and suffering
caused by former policies of the National Party" while
simultaneously distancing himself and his party from apartheid
crimes.32 Although claiming that the purpose of his submission was
not "to try to find excuses for [apartheid] abuses but to explain the
354. See, e.g., M. S. Prabhakara, Apartheid Victim Pardons Tormentors, The Hindu, July
20, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File (noting that there is no ex-
plicit remorse requirement).
355. See ASMAL ET AL., supra note 4, at 24.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 17, 23.
358. Id. at 23.
359. Id. at 17.
360. Stephen Laufer, Decades of Soul Searching Are to Come, BUS. DAY., Nov. 8, 1996,
at 13.
361. Id.
362. De Klerk supra note 265, at 13; see also Daisy Jones, De Kerk's Apology Draws
Parties' Criticism, STAR, Aug. 22, 1996, at 1.
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historic context within which they occurred," de Klerk described at
length how the apartheid regime sincerely believed "an ANC
Government would lead to Communist domination" and that the
regime's struggle against the ANC played "an important role in the
West's global resistance to the expansion of Soviet Communism.9
De Klerk denied that the government ever authorized murder,
torture, rape, or assault and insisted that it only approved
"unconventional strategies" involving "information gathering,
disinformation and assistance to outside organisations opposed
to the revolutionary forces."3" Needless to say, many political
parties including the ANC, SACP, AZAPO, DP, and even the IFP
publicly condemned de Klerk's submission as "incomplete and
unsatisfactory. 6'
Although de Klerk refused to apply for amnesty,3" many be-
lieve that he must make a substantive and genuine public apology to
the people of South Africa in which he condemns apartheid as an
evil system both in concept and application.367 The closest he has
come is expressing his "deep regret" about apartheid in Parliament
in February 1996' and his "deepest sympathy with all those on all
sides who suffered during the conflict" to the Commission in
August 1996.36 These concessions have done little to foster recon-
ciliation. De Klerk's more recent apology for apartheid on May 14,
1997, further jeopardized the reconciliation process by once again
distancing the NP from the murders of prominent anti-apartheid
activists.3 0 The ANC rightfully rejected de Klerk's May 14, 1997,
apology, explaining that "[it would be asking too much of South
Africans to accept the apology in the absence of full disclosure of the
truth. 37
If genuine reconciliation is to occur in South Africa, the NP
must publicly acknowledge its active and deliberate role in the
commission and continuation of all apartheid crimes. Archbishop
Desmond Tutu tried unsuccessfully to persuade P.W. Botha, former
apartheid-era President, to apply for amnesty or at the very least
publicly acknowledge some responsibility for the apartheid crimes
363. De Klerk, supra note 265, at 6, 8.
364. Id. at 8.
365. Jones, supra note 362, at 1.
366. See De Kierk Decides Against Amnesty, Reports from SAPA, May 5, 1997, available
at <http://www.truth.org.za/sapa9705/s970505g.htm>.
367. See ASMAL ET AL., supra note 4, at 30.
368. Id. at 30-31.
369. De Klerk supra note 265, at 13.
370. De Klerk Distances, supra note 153.
371. See ANC Slams de Klerk's Submission to the TRC, Reports from SAPA, May 14,
1997, available at <http://truth.org.za/sapa9705/s970514h.htm>.
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committed during his presidency. Botha offered the Commission a
manuscript of his biography instead of public testimony, but was
warned that the manuscript did not satisfy the requirements of the
Truth and Reconciliation Act . In the end, few senior apartheid
officials have applied for amnesty or publicly apologized. Now,
more than ever, the people of South Africa need the Truth
Commission's final report to "expose apartheid's lies and... finally
destroy the facade of sanity and idealism that apartheid maintains in
the eyes of its erstwhile active and passive adherents."
' 3
De Klerk and Botha have both criticized the Truth Commission
for focusing too much attention on the crimes of the apartheid gov-
ernment and not enough on the crimes of the ANC. '7 The ANC has
repeatedly said that it owes no apology to de Klerk for having
waged "a just and legitimate struggle against a criminal system
which was the brainchild of his political party.,,7 The ANC asked
de Klerk several times to come forward with his knowledge of the
human rights violations committed by the apartheid death squads 76
and yet de Klerk remains silent, continuing to profess his ignorance
and innocence. The ANC and its leaders, on the other hand, have
publicly accepted responsibility for all "excesses" committed during
the course of the armed struggle and have apologized to the Com-
mission and the people of South Africa.37
Whether fighting for or against apartheid, amnesty applicants
have a moral obligation to apologize to the people they harmed. An
expression of genuine remorse not only may help to ease the pain of
victims and their relatives but also goes a long way towards foster-
ing feelings of reconciliation among South Africans. When
applicants testify on public television about committing brutal
crimes in a smug or heartless fashion, they show a lack of respect for
their audience and for the amnesty process. At the same time, a
contrition requirement may result in feigned and insincere remorse,
embittering the public even more. The point is probably moot,
372. Pieter Malan & Esther Waugh, Truth Commission Warns PW Botha as He Offers
His Life Story Instead of Atonement, SUNDAY INDEPENDENCE, Nov. 24, 1996, at 3.
373. ASMAL ET AL., supra note 4, at 33.
374. See, e.g., Justice Malala, "It's All Twak," Says de Klerk, STAR, Nov. 4, 1996, at 3
(quoting de Klerk, "we are fed up with the way in which the ANC is abusing the
work of the Commission").
375. We Owe No Apology to FW, STAR, Nov. 4, 1996, at 3.
376. Id.
377. See ANC STATEMENT, supra note 198, at 11; see also Inigo Gilmore, Mbeki Apolo-
gises for ANC Atrocities in Liberation War, TIMES (London), Aug. 23, 1996, at 1 ("We
recognise there were excesses and want to apologise."); Anti-Apartheid Leaders Detail
Own Atrocities, Hous. CHRON., May 13, 1997, at 13 ('We regret the deaths and injuries
to civilians arising from armed actions. We apologize to the next of kin for the suffer-
ing and hurt.").
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however, given that Archbishop Tutu, the head of the Commission,
publicly announced that amnesty applicants do not need to show
remorse and may even express pride in their actions.3'
Even if the Committee cannot require actual apologies, they
could make amnesty contingent on the performance of some act of
contrition to benefit victims or their families. For instance, the
Committee could require the applicant to do volunteer work in a
victim's community or to pay for the costs of educating one of the
victim's children. Unfortunately, any such imposition is unlikely. In
fact, Archbishop Tutu has said that he prefers to challenge
perpetrators to figure out on their own what they need to do to
repent rather than having the Committee prescribe some specific act
of contrition."a Of course, there is the risk that perpetrators will not
engage in such soul-searching, nor take active steps to express their
apologies and regret, unless required to do so. The reconciliation
process suffers as a result.
VII.WILL THE AMNESTY PROCESS FOSTER RECONCILIATION AMONG
SOUTH AFRICANS?
The amnesty process is predicated on the belief that uncovering
the "truth" about the apartheid past will pave the way toward rec-
onciliation among the diverse ethnic and political groups in South
Africa. As one journalist aptly described the Truth Commission and
the amnesty process:
[t]he effort assumes that truth is a balm, and that recording
the horrors of the past will by itself help diminish the
chance they will be repeated in the future. Not everyone
agrees that recording the horrors is enough. The truth
commission itself is the result of a compromise embodied
in its guarantee of amnesty to those who confess. One side
favored unrelenting punishment for political criminals....
The other wanted to wash its hands of apartheid, without
even paying the price of humiliation through exposure.'
Archbishop Tutu, the champion and chairman of the Truth
Commission, concedes that "[t]he commission remains a risky and
delicate business," but insists that "it remains the only alternative to
378. See South Africa; Tutu Issues Appeal for Amnesty Applications, Africa News, Dec.
10, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, AFRNWS File.
379. Gilbert A. Lewthwaite, Airing Apartheid's Filthy Linen, BALT. SUN, Dec. 17, 1996,
at 2A, available in 1996 WL 6652030.
380. Jerelyn Eddings, The Shield of Truth, U.S. NEWS &WORLD REP., Feb. 10, 1997, at 13.
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Nuremberg on the one hand and amnesia on the other." 1 In an ap-
peal to political leaders and potential amnesty applicants to come
forward, Archbishop Tutu said:
[t]here is no instrument in the country with the same
potential as this process for ending the accusations and
counter-accusations about the past, the recriminations and
the political bickering which will plague this country's life
for generations to come if you do not seize the opportunity
of using properly the Commission which you created.82
Despite Archbishop Tutu's conviction that the Truth Commission
and the amnesty process provide the only path toward reconciliation
and national unity in South Africa's deeply divided society, many
South Africans seriously question the value of the Truth Commis-
sion's work.
Public criticism of the Truth Commission suggests the amnesty
process has been much better at establishing the truth than at pro-
moting reconciliation. Many of the attacks have come from White
conservatives who claim the Commission is a one-sided organiza-
tion, intent on discrediting the Afrikaners and glorifying the ANC.
For example, one editorial complains that:
[t]he [C]ommission is obviously being used to present a
bad image of the previous government and put the
Afrikaans people in a bad light.... The object is evidently
to show to the world that apartheid was the greatest evil in
South Africa. The terrorists were all pure, innocent people
who never put a foot wrong but were unjustly
persecuted .3
Another conservative editorial called the Truth Commission
hearings a "judicial charade, with histrionics, fables, uncorroborated
evidence, and [a] lack of cross examination" and accused the
"biased" Commission of "bring[ing] itself and everyone connected
with it into disrepute."" De Klerk has repeatedly criticized the
Commission as "uneven-handed" and "biased" against the former
381. Id.
382. An Open Appeal to Political Leaders and Potential Amnesty Applicants, Truth and
Reconciliation Commission Press Release, Dec. 9, 1996, available at <http://
www.truth.org.za/pr/p961209a.htm>.
383. C.M.J. van Rensburg, ANC Campaign of Violence, CITIZEN, Oct. 30, 1996, at 21.
384. Cassandra Verfontein, EL Truth Hearings Show Utter Bias, CITIZEN, Nov. 21,
1996, at 25.
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government.38 Even Archbishop Tutu has chastised Commission
members for making statements during hearings that could be char-
acterized as biased.38 According to national surveys, a third of
Whites interviewed perceive the Commission to be favoring Black
over White South Africans8 7 and many Whites scornfully refer to the
Commission as the "Kleenex Commission 38' because of all the tears
it has generated.
These observations ignore the reality of the Amnesty Commit-
tee hearings. Thus far, the decisions handed down by the Amnesty
Committee have demonstrated considerable leniency toward
conservative Whites. For example, in December 1996, the Committee
not only granted Brian Mitchell amnesty, but also granted amnesty
to four Afrikaner men belonging to right-wing groups who planted
bombs in Black schools after Mandela began negotiating with de
Klerk.389 Most of the amnesty hearings before March 1997 involved
supporters of the apartheid regime, and the Mitchell precedent vir-
tually assures that these applicants will receive amnesty provided
they do not conceal relevant facts and did not commit their crimes
for explicitly personal reasons. Additionally, White conservatives
have the Truth Commission to thank for the extension of the cut-off
date until May 10, 1994, which has allowed several White conserva-
tives who set off bombs at polling stations in April 1994 to come
forward.i Without the Commission's pressure, President Mandela
would likely have remained opposed to a time extension.393
Although the majority of South Africans interviewed in
national surveys endorse the work of the Commission, many oppose
the granting of amnesty to grave human rights violators and more
than half believe the "perpetrators" testifying before the• • • 392 ..
Commission should face trial. This sentiment is particularly strong
among Black South Africans. As one editorial explained, "Many
black activists resent that police and others who brutalized members
385. De Klerk's Attack on TRC Deplorable: LHR, Reports from SAPA, Mar. 27, 1997,
available at <http://www.truth.org.za/sapa9703/s970327a.htm>.
386. Robert Brand, Tutu Lashes TRC Members For Their Bias, STAR, Nov. 26, 1996, at
1.
387. Richard Carmel, Fierce Emotions as South Africa Seeks Peace, NAT'L. CATHOLIC
REP., Jan. 10, 1997.
388. See Sixty Minutes: Profile: Forgive But Not Forget; Commission Set Up in South
Africa to Hear War Atrocities; Criminals Given Amnesty (CBS television broadcast, Feb.
16, 1997).
389. See Apartheid Commission Pardons Seven As Amnesty Appeals Flow In, Agence
France Presse, Dec. 12, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, AFP File; South Africa
Acts on Amnesty Petitions, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 13, 1996, at 13.
390. See Daley, supra note 35, at A6.
391. See Brand, supra note 34, at 3.
392. Carmel, supra note 387.
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of the country's black majority may go unpunished, literally getting
away with murder."" 3 On the whole, Black South Africans have
been extraordinarily tolerant of an amnesty process that has
operated to benefit many White applicants at the expense of
primarily Black victims. However, sometimes the decisions of the
Amnesty Committee may go too far. Decisions like those granting
amnesty to Brian Mitchell9 and to the Afrikaners convicted of
blowing up Black schools, and the pressure put on Mandela to
extend the cut-off date primarily to cover right-wing bomb attacks
against Blacks in early 199439 have many Black South Africans
wondering if these attempts to buy "truth" have come at too
Costly.39
6
Official reactions from predominantly Black parties were
mixed. The ANC party publicly endorsed the extension of the
cut-off date and the application deadline, as well as the Mitchell
decision.3 97 The ANC found Mitchell's testimony extremely valuable
because it identified the apartheid security network as being pri-
marily responsible for the "Black on Black" violence and implicated
senior level IFP members in major attacks on the ANC.3" The PAC
denounced the Committee's decisions of December 1996 as
"naked injustice for these victims of apartheid crime."'9 Leaders of
the PAC's military wing complained that many of its anti-apartheid
activists were "rotting" in jail while apartheid criminals were walk-
ing around free.4"'
The IFP, a predominantly Black party, has publicly opposed the
Truth and. Reconciliation Commission from its inception and
discourages IFP members from applying for amnesty.401 As a result,
very few IFP members have applied for amnesty.40 The IFP
393. A Struggle with Many Truths, CHI. TRIB, Feb. 15, 1997, at 24.
394. See Healing South Africa's Wounds, FRESNO BEE, Dec. 16, 1996, at B4.
395. Daley, supra note 35, at A6.
396. Dellios, supra note 164, at A27.
397. PAC Condemns Mitchell's Release, Reports from SAPA, Dec. 11, 1996, available at
<http://www.truth.org.za/sapa9612/s961211e.htm>.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id.; see also PAC Accuses TRC of Bias Against APLA Cadres, Reports from SAPA,
Feb. 14, 1997, available at <http://www.truth.org.za/sapa9702/s970214a.htm> (noting
the PAC's accusation that the TRC is unfairly prioritizing cases of people like Dirk
Coetzee and Brian Mitchell over hundreds of applications from imprisoned APLA
cadres).
401. In August 1997, IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi ran a half-page advertise-
ment in newspapers that called on IFP's members to boycott all TRC activity. See TRC
Concern over Buthelezi's Advertisement, Reports from SAPA, Aug. 14, 1997, available in
<http://www.truth.org.za/sapa9708/s979814f.htm>.
402. See Brand, supra note 34, at 3. At the close of the first deadline for applications
in December 1996, only a few IFP members had applied as individuals, but the IFP
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continues to attack the TRC as "a monster which is not only failing
to heal the' old wounds but, indeed, is opening new ones" and to
accuse Archbishop Tutu of infecting the TRC with his own pro-ANC
and anti-IFP "bias."4 In May 1997, the IFP issued a statement
reiterating these criticisms: "[als currently constituted the Truth
Commission is not promoting reconciliation and nation building.
The [pro-] African National Congress sympathies of the commission
are patent. All other parties are treated in a second-class manner
bordering on contempt."4°' Given that violent clashes between the
IFP and the ANC are one of the most pressing problems facing
South Africa today,w the IFP's response to the Truth Commission
suggests that reconciliation between these two groups is unlikely.
In August 1997, AZAPO, a mostly Black anti-apartheid move-
ment, seriously questioned the Committee's decision to grant
amnesty to Dirk Coetzee, a former police hit squad commander, and
his police operatives, Almond Mofomela and David Tshikilange, for
the highly publicized murder of human rights lawyer Griffiths
406Mxenge in 1981. The three men had been convicted of Mxenge's
murder on May 15, 1997, in the Durban High Court.0 7 A spokesper-
son for AZAPO said the Amnesty Committee's decision confirms
that the truth and reconciliation process has "nothing to do with
justice... [or] reconciliation," but rather "has everything to do with
political expediency of the government."408 The spokesperson went
on to explain how the amnesty process affects victims and their
families: "itis like turning the knife after the initial blow to the heart.
It causes more pain and reveals the futilitZ of saying the families can
always oppose the granting of amnesty."4
South Africans across the political and racial spectrum have
been voicing doubt about the Commission's ability to foster recon-
ciliation and national unity. At the same time that members of the
Black community are finding their sense of justice sorely tested by
the seemingly indiscriminate grants of amnesty to White applicants,
much of the White and conservative populations in South Africa are
had not applied as a group. South Africa; Jailbirds Rush for Amnesty, Africa News, Dec.
20, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, AFRNWS File.
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SAPA, May 22, 1997, available at <http://www.trutiorg.za/sapa9705/s970522e.htm>.
404. NP Withdrawal from TRC Not Surprising: IFP, Reports from SAPA, May 19,
1997, available at <http://www.truth.org.za/sapa9705/s970519a.htm>.
405. See Inkatha Leaders Blamed fir 1994 Massacre, supra note 206 ("Nearly 20,000
people have died during 11 years of violence between ANC and IFP supporters.").
406. Bitter Reality, supra note 51.
407. Murder Masterminds, supra note 83.
408. See Bitter Reality, supra note 51.
409. Id.
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accusing the Commission of "bias" against Whites.1' While the
Commission is doing a formidable job of uncovering the truth about
the apartheid-era crimes, its it is having far less success in promot-
ing reconciliation. Although there is logic in the argument that the
ANC government "must temper its reaction to the past, given how it
came to power and the continuing importance of the white popula-
tion to the economy and in the security forces,"' 11 the Truth
Commission must pay heed to the complaints from the much larger
Black population in South Africa if the Commission is serious about
promoting reconciliation in the vast majority of South Africans. For
the amnesty process to succeed, the Commission must focus more of
its attention on fostering reconciliation and less of its attention on
exposing the painful "truth" at the expense of justice.
CONCLUSION
South Africa's dual goals of establishing the truth about the
apartheid past and of fostering reconciliation among its discordant
populations are not always complimentary. The Amnesty
Committee must employ the amnesty criteria of the Truth and
Reconciliation Act to achieve a proper balance. At the present time,
South Africa's definition of amnesty is too broad and the Amnesty
Committee's procedures are too lenient. This Note recommends a
narrow interpretation of the amnesty provisions in order to rectify
the current imbalance between truth and reconciliation. Despite its
discretionary authority, the Committee has made some extremely
disturbing decisions, which it has justified in the name of political
expediency and the search for truth. While both are necessary
components of the amnesty process, the Committee must not lose
sight of the other purpose of the Act-the formation of a human
rights culture in South Africa and the promotion of reconciliation
and national unity among South Africans.
410. See discussion supra Part VII.
411. Heibst, supra note 10, at M6.
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